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FOREWORD 
At its twentieth session, held in Lima in April 1984, the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean decided, inter alia, that at the 1985 session of 
the Committee of the Whole one of the main items should be "the examination of those 
pivotal aspects of long-term economic and social development policy which could 
serve as sources of inspiration for meeting the challenges posed to the countries of 
the region by the changes in the international economy".1/ 
Since that date, the Secretariat has given priority attention to the fulfil-
ment of this mandate. First of all, various technical studies were prepared which 
are included in a set of documents completed in April of this year„2/ Secondly, an 
expert meeting was convened to examine and comment on these documents. At this 
meeting, held at ECLAC headquarters from 29 April to 3 May, over a hundred person-
alities from inside and outside the region assembled to give their different points 
of view in a rich and fertile debate.3/ 
The present document is a revised version of the analytical summary 
considered on that occasion and it takes up some of the many lines of thought which 
arose from the debates. It has been submitted to the Committee of the Whole of 
ECLAC —and, more broadly, to the governments of the region— in pursuance of what 
was decided in the resolution mentioned above. Its central purpose is to continue 
to encourage the exchange of ideas on the most important elements of the economic 
policies and economic and social development strategies which should be applied in 
the years to come, and in it the options open to the region in order to seek a 
response to the present crisis and make proper preparations for the future are 
analysed. The document is divided into three parts. 
Part I seeks to explain the past evolution, the advances made in the 
economic and social field, and the elements of heterogeneity which define the 
possibilities open for the future, after which attention is centred on the abrupt 
changes in trends which took place as from 1980 and the origin, characteristics and 
scope of the crisis. 
Part II explores the restrictions and conditioning factors affecting the 
future development of the countries of the region, placing emphasis on those 
phenomena which call for important changes in the historical growth pattern, on the 
natural assumption that the region must overcome the crisis and reactivate the 
economies which make it up. 
/Part III 
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Part JII refers to the general orientations that could be given to economic and 
social development in the medium and long term. Special account is taken of the 
time horizon of the next ten years, although consideration is also given to the 
longer-term prospects linked, inter alia, with the foreseeable changes in the inter-
national economy. On the whole, the proposals involved are of a very preliminary 
nature and will call for subsequent elaboration. 
Both in the long-term evolution and in the different manifestations of the 
crisis and the way of tackling it, there are important differences among the Latin 
American countries, stemming from their economic size, their resource endowment, the 
relative level of development, the special features of their peoples, and the various 
approaches to economic policy taken by their governments. The possibilities open to 
them and the problems faced by each of them therefore display great diversity. This 
obviously makes it impracticable —even if it were desirable— to try to work out 
generally valid development•formulas, but this nevertheless does not detract from 
the value of the search for common denominators, the examination of national 
experiences, and the discussion of some of the most important elements involved in 
the definition of the development strategies that could be followed in the years to 
come. Naturally, the specific forms that these strategies and policies may take can 
only be considered within the ambit of each country, bearing in mind its special 




At this moment in time, in the middle of the 1980s, it seems superfluous to stress 
that in recent years the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have suffered 
the deepest and longest recession since the 1930s. The harmful consequences of the 
crisis are all too well known. The region as a whole has seen real per capita 
income fall to the level it had already reached in 1977; open unemployment and 
underemployment have grown; rates of saving and investment have been eroded; consump-
tion stands at a depressed level, and real wages have shrunk. Moreover, the room for 
manoeuvre in the application of economic policy has become very restricted. 
The severe imbalances of external and internal origin which arose in all the 
countries have been reduced to some extent, but in no wise overcome. Although 
improvements —albeit only temporary— are observed in the balance-of-payments 
situation, inflationary tensions have reappeared in a number of cases and are yielding 
only slowly in others. Furthermore, the recessive nature of the adjustments which in 
many cases have made these improvements possible sheds doubts on their permanence or 
viability. 
The fact that most of the countries of the region have based their growth to an 
excessive extent on external indebtedness and have tried to put off the most painful 
expressions of the adjustment process by this means has led to the accumulation of a 
heavy debt burden whose servicing costs are a singularly negative influence on the 
balance of payments and public finances. This latter feature helps to give distinc-
tive characteristics to the effects of the international recession in Latin America 
compared with other developing regions. 
The immediate problems that have to be faced merge with and sometimes magnify 
the structural shortcomings of the Latin American economies, which had given rise to 
severe lags and imbalances even back in the 1970s. The peculiar combination of 
modernization with structural heterogeneity which is a special feature of Latin 
America has had the result of causing profound economic and social changes which, 
while they represent significant advances towards more complex societies and 
economies, retain at the same time in their structure heterogeneous elements which 




Outstanding among these elements are the lack of suitable structural links 
between primary and secondary activities; inadequate forward and backward linkages 
in the manufacturing sector, together with cases of inefficiency and technological 
backwardness; the extreme external vulnerability of the economies; the dual 
character of agriculture, which operates at both the modern and the subsistence 
level, and the incapacity to create sufficient productive jobs to cope with the 
rapid expansion of the economically active population: a factor which in turn helps 
to explain the persistence of the extreme poverty in which substantial portions of 
the population still live and the economic and social heterogeneity which continues 
to be present in all the countries. 
The above-mentioned economic phenomena have been accompanied by important 
political and social changes. In some countries, long-standing tensions have over-
flowed into violent situations which have still not been solved. In others, 
autocratic regimes have been replaced by elected civilian governments. Although it 
is not easy to establish a cause and effect relationship between the evolution of 
economic, political and social developments, there is no doubt that there are 
multiple interrelationships between them, and these may help to explain the unusual 
political effervescence to be noted now in the region and the renewed importance 
which is being given in many countries to the attainment and consolidation of plural-
istic and democratic societies as an intrinsic objective of development. 
This effervescence forms part of a very dynamic picture of change, both in 
the region and in the surrounding world. The central countries, for their part, are 
going through a veritable technological revolution which, among many other conse-
quences, will have the result of significantly and rapidly changing the system of 
comparative advantages in world trade. This, together with gradual changes in the 
hierarchic position of different nations in the international economy and the consol-
idation of new actors on the world stage —such as the transnational corporations— 
involves opportunities but also perils for countries which have been characterized 
up to now by their slow capacity for adaptation. 
Furthermore, for many different reasons, the Latin American countries will 
continue to face growing difficulties in the years to come in mobilizing external 
financing: a telling contrast with the fact that the main industrialized economy of 
the world has now become a net importer of capital. 
/At the 
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At the domestic level, the crushing weight of the external debt, the contrac-
tion in levels of saving and investment, and the gradual obsolescence of the exis-
ting stock of capital —which has been inadequately replaced in the last few years--
are only a few of the new factors which present themselves as obstacles to the 
reactivation of the economies. 
In short, after over 30 years of impressive achievements but also of important 
shortcomings in economic and social matters, the countries of the region now stand 
at the crossroads. If they do not persist with the adjustment process —despite its 
painful consequences— and if they do not adopt reactivation programmes on new bases, 
the outlook is not encouraging. 
Faced with all the above phenomena, we must reject from the outset the view 
that the recent recession, deep though it is, is only of a transitory nature and that 
in the near future the countries of the region can return —on the basis of the old 
historical model— to the path of growth they had become accustomed to during the 
three decades following the last war. Instead, events seem to confirm the hypothesis 
that the countries of the region are now faced with different circumstances which it 
will require time, sacrifices and novel solutions to overcome. 
We must also reject as a way out of the crisis the recommendations based on a 
neo-liberal paradigm which advocate the decided integration of the Latin American 
economies into the world economy so that the reactivation of the industrialized 
countries can take along with it the developing countries. Quite apart from the 
well-justified skepticism which might be felt regarding the sustained nature of the 
recovery in the central economies (and, if such a recovery were to take place, the 
dissemination of its effects among the developing countries), it seems very unlikely 
that conditions could exist in which all the Latin American and Caribbean countries 
could simultaneously rapidly increase their exports and place them on markets which 
are of limited size and are also conditioned in the central countries by strong 
protectionist tendencies designed to allow the technologically backward industries 
of these nations to adapt themselves to a new situation. The fact is that a new 
international division of labour is being built up which will not exactly depend on 
the free play of the market forces. 
This is not to deny the presence of important potential for the exports of the 
region or to deny that some of the small economies could convert their export sector 
into the motor of growth. What we do wish to maintain is that it would not be 
realistic to concentrate the efforts of all countries on a strategy aimed at the 
/indiscriminate opening 
indiscriminate opening up of their economies at the expense of established economic 
activities which were created with great effort and sacrifice in the period following 
the war and which continue to generate dynamic impulses, although not always as 
efficiently as might be desired. 
This document only briefly sketches the bases and guiding principles of a 
strategy which neither advocates seeking reactivation on the basis of historical 
patterns nor espouses the paradigm in vogue in some industrialized countries. The 
strategy put forward is based on the profound conviction that the countries of the 
region must take decisive steps to react to the set of new circumstances of external 
and internal origin which will condition both their growth possibilities and their 
possibilities of achieving other universal objectives of development. 
If such action is not taken, then the uncorrected imbalances will probably 
persist, accompanied by a rate of economic activity which is very slow or even 
negative. This would not only compromise the achievements of the past but would also 
jeopardize the possibility of consolidating and intensifying the recent processes of 
greater democratization in several countries. 
The central idea on which a considerable part of this document is based 
consists of the recognition that development must be guided by the principles of 
growth, autonomy, equity and democracy. The relations between these objectives, 
however, are complex. They are interdependent, since it is impossible to conceive 
of self-sustaining development without all of them being satisfied to some essential 
degree, yet at the same time there are many situations where there is a conflict 
between the simultaneous full achievement of these objectives. In such situations, 
it is necessary to seek solutions which ensure that each objective is fulfilled to 
more than a certain minimum extent. 
Naturally, in specific national situations, it may be particularly urgent to 
try to achieve one or another of the objectives in particular. In the present Latin 
American crisis, for example, it is clearly imperative to recover autonomy in the 
formulation, and above all the implementation, of the countries' economic policies 
if it is desired to recover the capacity to grow and to make new changes in the 
societies of the region. As already noted, it is very probable that the unfinished 
structural changes in the international economy will prevent the region as a whole 
from benefitting to a substantial degree from the financial aid and markets of the 
central countries. We must therefore inevitably admit that Latin America and the 
/Caribbean have 
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Caribbean have before them an enormous task in solving new difficulties and old 
problems by their own efforts. In other words, it is neither realistic nor 
desirable to expect the solutions to come from outside. 
It should be clearly understood that the foregoing does not mean that the 
countries of the region should be cut off from the financial, trade and technological 
flows operating in the world economy, but that their endogenous capacity for the 
development of production and technology should be strengthened, their national and 
collective autonomy should be improved, and in this way the region's insertion into 
the changing international economy should gradually be modified. 
To this end, the countries of the region will have to adapt their productive 
apparatus in order to make fuller use of the stimuli of national, subregional and 
regional demand and selectively gain access to international markets. Both the 
adjustment and the reactivation will basically be the result of the creativity, 
efforts and initiative of the Latin American societies. It follows from this that 
among the universal objectives of development —growth, change, improvement in income 
distributions greater autonomy, and progress towards more pluralistic, participative 
and democratic societies— the objective of gaining greater autonomy or increasing 
the room for manoeuvre in the formulation and execution of economic policy acquires 
special urgency. Without satisfying this pre-requisite it would be difficult to 
achieve the other objectives. 
The starting point for an alternative strategy lies in gaining political 
recognition of the fact that the region is probably at the beginning of a stage of 
slow development and that without the integral mobilization of the social energy of 
each country the likely outlook would rather be one of further setbacks. Conse-
quently, it is important to formulate a strategy which reconciles the adjustment with 
the reactivation and reorientation of the economies right from the start. There are, 
of course, no easy recipes or painless methods of achieving the adjustment. What is 
undoubtedly to be recommended is that the cost of this adjustment should be better 
spread over time and among the different strata of the population. The depth and 
seriousness of the crisis have erased the dividing lines between short-term and 
medium-term economic policy, since the adjustment, reactivation and development do 
not correspond to successive phases of the strategy but form part of the same policy. 
This way of conceiving economic policy requires greater emphasis to be placed on 
/the protection 
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the protection and stimulation of supply —especially that which generates foreign 
exchange through exports or efficient import substitution— rather than on strict 
controls tending to reduce demand. 
With regard to the reorientation of the economic development of the countries 
of the region, it will be essential to redouble our efforts to overcome structural 
imbalances such as the lack of proper linkages between economic activities, ineffi-
ciency, technological lags, weakness of management, and shortcomings in the training 
of labour and the form of insertion in international markets. To this end, the task 
of articulating the productive system in the most efficient manner must be undertaken 
with a pragmatic and flexible approach. As already noted, the development of new 
export lines must be carried out in a selective mannter. 
Efforts must also be made, with regard to production aimed at satisfying 
domestic demand, to improve its efficiency, secure greater inter or intra-sectoral 
linkages, and adapt advanced technologies —or develop our own technologies— which 
are appropriate to the needs and conditions of the countries of the region. 
The Latin American economies will very probably suffer for a long time to 
come from constraints due to the shortage of financing and the need to make 
remittances of capital abroad. This being so, the domestic savings effort and the 
effectiveness of investment will be called upon to play a decisive role, for which 
purpose suitable fiscal policies and the reordering of financial systems will be 
needed. 
In this connection, the fulfilment of the objective of equity will also play 
a functional role. The reversal of the downward trend in the income of the masses 
of the population will make it necessary to increase the supply of basic goods 
—food, clothing, footwear, construction materials, some consumer durables— in 
which the region has already acquired a good deal of experience and whose production 
generally requires only a few imported inputs but makes intensive use of labour. 
This does not mean that technologically complex activities should be discouraged, 
but they should instead be promoted in a selective manner, preferably in line with 
a subregional integration criterion. 
Intra-regional co-operation would thus become another pillar of the 
reactivation and development effort, not only on the basis of the traditional 
criterion of uniting markets and substituting imports, but as an important"means of 
gaining greater efficiency and developing new technologies. It is not a question of 
/insisting on 
- 9 -
insisting on the fulfilment of formal undertakings which call for the gradual and 
progressive harmonization of policies and activities in national economic life, but 
rather of promoting joint action to solve common problems. 
Among such problems is that of tackling in a collective manner —at the 
subregional or regional level— some of the limiting factors of the international 
economy and even possibly getting together to try to influence or alter the intertia 
displayed by the policies of the industrialized countries. Relations with the 
central countries will continue to play a decisive role in the future of the 
countries of the region. Latin America will have to make a greater effort to inter-
pret and react to the trends of the international economy. This is essential not only 
in order to take advantage of external opportunities, but also in order to anticipate 
and reduce the effects of the restrictions coming from the same origin. Joint 
negotiations, or at least consultations among the governments of the region, could 
continue to play an important role in ordering trade and financial flows, as well as 
in putting forward solutions to specific obstacles such as those deriving from 
external indebtedness, especially as regards the need to give some relief to many 
countries of the region and share costs more equitably between creditors and debtors. 
The development of human resources at all levels must also play an important 
role in the reorganization of the development of the countries of the region. This 
is an unavoidable condition for stimulating creativity, gaining greater efficiency, 
applying and developing appropriate technologies, and even helping to form more 
pluralistic, participative and democratic societies. 
It will also be necessary, at least in some countries, to put into effect 
long-postponed reforms for modernizing and improving the linkages among primary 
activities and between them and secondary activities. This is particularly 
relevant with regard to overcoming the disparities between the modern agricultural 
sector and subsistence peasant agriculture. The solution of this heterogeneity of 
production in the agricultural sector and the overcoming of other long-standing 
problems in Latin American agriculture will call, inter alia, for the strengthening 
of the peasant economy by giving it greater access to productive resources; reduction 
of the dependence of the sector in order to adapt the technologies used to local 
resource endowments, and seeking a progressive reduction in the asymmetry observed 
in the international insertion of the Latin American countries into the agricultural 
commodity markets. In the same connection, it will be necessary to reorganize 
/industrial development 
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industrial development with a view to achieving more efficient forms of production 
which are better adapted to the conditions actually prevailing in the region and 
have greater intra- or intersectoral integration, with a view to achieving what is 
known as the "endogenous technological dynamization nucleus". Small and medium-
sized enterprises would play an important role in this effort, not only because they 
can reach high levels of efficiency, but also because they frequently generate more 
employment and more value added per unit of investment than large-scale enterprises. 
The reordering of Latin American development necessarily involves the 
reappraisal of the role of the different economic agents, and particularly that of 
the State. It is therefore also necessary to explore the dynamic tension which 
exists between the logic of the market —which, for reasons of efficiency, favours 
the fittest without any considerations of justice as regards the distribution of 
income or power— and the administrative assignment of resources through direct State 
decisions. Both forms of assigning resources should coexist* although with different 
mixes and forms from one country to another, according to their customs, institutions 
and special forms of political interaction. 
The scheme of development advocated is conceived within a participative and 
democratic framework, viewed not only as an intrinsic objective but also as an 
indispensable instrument for fulfilling the economic objectives. In a crisis, there 
is always a temptation to use authoritarian solutions. These, however, would do 
away with the elements of solidarity and creativity which the resumption of develop-
ment calls for in both the political and the economic spheres. Therefore, the main 
means of settling social conflicts, converting new sectors of the population into 
bearers of change, and reconciling the conduct of the agents of production should be 
democratic concertation, with the government and the governed sharing power and 
responsibilities around a national development project. The possibility of over-
coming the crisis is not to be found only, or even principally, in the technical 
and economic field, but rather in the political sphere, since it depends basically 
on achieving the union of the State and civil society in the struggle to recover the 
capacity to achieve development. 
In short, the development of the countries of the region in the 1980s is faced 
with similar dilemmas —both false and authentic— to those which it faced before, . 
among them: growth versus equity; outward-oriented versus inward-oriented strategies; 
consumption versus investment; the State versus private enterprise; planning versus 
/the market; 
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the market; and the exploitation of resources versus protection of the environment, 
Now, however, these dilemmas have to be faced within a framework of radically changed 
circumstances which change their scope and characteristics as well as the way they 
must be tackled. The present document identifies some of these changes, and the way 
in which they affect Latin America's prospects, and it also presents a preliminary 
sketch of the lines of action which the region and the individual countries could 
begin to establish with the purpose of resuming the path towards economic and social 
progress. The fact that we have to simultaneously tackle three processes which 
cannot easily be reconciled —stabilization, reactivation and structural change— 
represents the most difficult task that the region has faced since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. 
/I. CHANGE 
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I. CHANGE AND CRISIS: LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 1950-1984 
1. Main features of the evolution of Latin American 
development since the end of the war 
In the economic and social fields, the region underwent profound changes in the .three 
decades from the period just after the war up to 1980. In a number of countries, 
such factors as the expansion of production capacity, the strengthening of the 
middle groups, the growth of education and health services and the dynamic insertion 
of the countries into the international economy gave rise among many social groups 
to the conviction that the pattern of development was running along the right lines. 
The numerous and important underlying problems seemed of lesser account compared 
with the achievements that were being made, and there was confidence that economic 
growth would eventually solve such difficulties. 
This confidence was temporarily further strengthened when, despite the world 
economic recession of 1974-1976 and the subsequent limited recovery of the centres, 
the region nevertheless managed to maintain its economic growth, although, as was 
later to be seen, at the cost of using up part of the available room for manoeuvre. 
Many countries affected by the energy crisis were able to maintain and even increase 
their imports, taking advantage of the abundant flow of external financing. The 
idea persisted in various circles that the storm clouds hanging over the 
international economy were only transitory, and that it would soon be possible to 
resume the upward trend which, as already noted, had characterized the evolution 
of the majority of the Latin American economies in previous decades. In short, 
it was confidently forecast that the 1980s would witness positive economic evolution 
without any serious upsets. 
As from 1981, however, it was seen that the prevailing development style 
suffered from great vulnerability, especially vis-a-vis external factors, and that 
some of the problems which it had been assumed were in the course of solution had 
not only not disappeared but had even got worse. The new situation highlighted 
both old and new difficulties and clearly revealed that they were now much greater 
than in any other period since the war. 
a) 1945-1965 
In Latin America, the period immediately following the war was characterized 
by the attempts to formulate an economic and social policy capable of structuring 
/and orienting 
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and orienting the partial measures arising from the reactions to internal and 
external phenomena. The international conflicts and crises which upset the Latin 
American economies up to the Second World War and the gradual transformation of 
predominantly rural societies into urban ones stand out among the causes giving 
rise to these domestic policies. 
Outstanding among the internal changes —sooner in some cases and later in' 
others— is the beginning of a strong trend to industrialization. Not everything 
can be boiled down to the appearance or strengthening of the industrial sector, 
however: at the same time that urbanization was taking place, a domestic market 
whose expansion was to replace international markets to a substantial extent as 
the motive force for economic development was being formed, new groups which would 
change social stratification began to arise, and in the political field, responses 
designed to channel the aspirations of the emerging groups arose. This set of 
phenomena is grouped together under the title of "inward-oriented development", 
which seeks in this way to give a graphic idea of the profound change in the pattern 
of development. 
The deliberate projects for change and the political regimes which promoted 
them assume very diverse concrete forms responding largely to the historical and 
structural differences of the countries. The terms 'reformism', 'populism' and 
'developmentalism' which have been used to describe them usually reflect, in their 
ambiguity, the difficulty of reducing that diversity to an overall picture. There 
were, however, common denominators which, in principle, referred both to certain 
circumstances repeatedly found in different cases and to the predominance of 
certain basic values. Outstanding among the latter are economic, social and 
political modernization, nationalism and statism. 
Modernization was directed towards the idea of building up urban industrial 
societies which broadly followed the model of the developed countries, although 
in order to arrive at that stage it was necessary to follow a different path. This 
idea covered economic change, spearheaded by deliberately promoted industrialization 
and by the improvement of the living conditions of the population as a result of 
increased income, expanded consumption and the opening up of access to social 
services, while the political structure was to be modified in order to integrate 




Nationalism expressed itself in two main senses. First of all, as a form 
of assertion vis-a-vis the developed centres from which most of the countries of 
Latin Afflerica depended to an extreme degree during the period of outward-oriented 
development. Secondly, as the integration of societies and economies which still 
needed to decant their national identity. Statism, for its part, consisted mainly 
of assigning to the State a decisive role in the formulation and execution of 
national projects of change. 
With natural differences of tone and emphasis, these values penetrated and 
became generalized in all the political movements and regimes arising from the 
crises of traditional governments in the 1930s. 
In the economic field, substitution industrialization played a central role. 
Initially, it was more the result of the countries' reaction to an external crisis 
than the fruit of a long-studied decision. Afterwards, the world war drastically 
reduced the availability of foreign exchange, bringing about as a more or less 
spontaneous reaction of the economic policies the need to administer the scarce 
foreign exchange available. Little by little, these policies were rationalized 
and incorporated longer-term objectives and instruments, until the idea of deliberate 
industrialization took shape. 
Exchange and tariff policies to protect the expansion of the branches producing 
non-durable consumer goods and some intermediate inputs gained importance. The 
State transferred resources to industry in order to facilitate the accumulation of 
capital, frequently through the appropriation of the surpluses from agriculture 
and the most profitable export lines. The public sector itself transformed the 
physical and educational infrastructure, and in many countries it created basic 
branches of the industrial infrastructure through government enterprises. 
A fairly widespread feature was that industrial development was linked to 
the domestic market (or the subregional market, in the case of the incipient economic 
integration processes), without being combined with the winning of external 
markets or with a systematic search for domestic competitiveness. This feature, 
understandable in the beginning because of the way the process sprang up in Latin 
America and the prevailing international conditions, and subsequently because of 
the tardiness in adapting the industrialization policy to the new conditions and 
possibilities of the world market, helped to accentuate the balance of payments 
problems of many countries. 
/If we 
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If we look at the economic process in greater detail we see that there were 
two ways of changing and growing, largely originating in the external economic 
relations. The first of these was adopted by the countries which had already made 
significant steps towards industrialization in the 1930s or after the Second World 
War. These were the relatively larger countries and those whose main commodity 
export or exports had come to have some influence in world markets. These were the 
countries which suffered the greatest restrictions on their import capacity and 
had to make different kinds of efforts to intensify their industrialization 
strategies. The Southern Cone countries, which had been the most advanced in 
previous stages, showed little dynamism, and none of them exceeded an annual growth 
rate of 4%. Colombia, for its part, attained an annual rate of 4.7% and Brazil 
and Mexico were close to 6%. In all cases, however, there was a gradual drop in 
the ratio between imports and the product. As the process speeded up, the resulting 
restriction on imports caused several countries to push ahead the substitution 
process to extents which frequently affected the level of efficiency of production, 
since there was no basic concern with raising domestic productivity and competitivity, 
nor with systematically promoting technological change. Growth was centered on the 
manufacturing sector, but its progress increasingly demanded the use of capital 
goods and intermediate inputs provided by branches of industry which were more 
difficult to develop. At the end of the period under examination (1965), the 
ratio between imports and the product in Brazil, Mexico and Argentina was less 
than 10%: a substantially lower ratio than that registered at the beginning of the 
1950s. 
In the second group of countries —medium-sized and small nations— 
substitution industrialization started from relatively incipient levels of 
manufacturing development, so they were able to progress without running into the 
external restrictions suffered by the first group. The annual growth rates of 
the product were higher in these countries, nearing or exceeding 6% in several 
cases. In this group of countries, those of Central America began to embark on a 
fruitful stage of subregional integration towards the end of this period. 
In the social field, urbanization and economic development finally consolidated 
a set of social groups which served as the political support for the style of 
development followed in this period. The State sought to orient the changes in 
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production, while the industrial entrepreneurs, middle and working class sectors, 
and at least part of the peasantry struggled to get away from their role as 
passive agents of development and become actual actors. 
An important feature of the evolution of the process of development in this 
period was the coexistence of traditional and new groups. The latter favoured 
the changes tending to emulate the industrialized societies, which served as their 
point of reference. However, they were up against both the resistence of the 
traditional groups and the natural difficulty of combining in a common project the 
different interests which mobilized them. Furthermore, differences sometimes arose 
within the new groups themselves. 
Naturally, the central values guiding the process of change were interpreted 
differently by the different social groups which supported the process. Certain 
common elements are to be identified, however, such as the expansion of access to 
education and other social services and to consumption. Furthermore, there was a 
general acceptance of the ideas of rationalization of the economy, transformation 
of the structure of production, increased efficiency, and the extension and 
intensification of the political, economic and social participation of the new 
social groups. There was also agreement on the need to encourage certain forms of 
social organization (trade unions, business organizations, political parties) 
which would make society more pluralistic and participative. 
Industrialization meant that the State would have to play a leading role 
in the beginning, while the industrial entrepreneurs were strengthening and 
modernizing their activities. The changes needed to convert the private sector 
into a dynamic agent of change did not always take place. Industrialization was 
partly centered on the processing of primary commodities, where traditional interests 
and patterns of behaviour were maintained. Thus, while being an agent of change, 
the industrial entrepreneurs were themselves structurally limited from having a type 
of behaviour which was clearly consistent with a modernizing industrial project. 
The middle sectors were strengthened both in numerical and political and 
social terms. Generally speaking, during the period of rise in the social scale 
these sectors showed a propensity to seek their support in the popular sectors; 
they played an important role in the expansion of consumption, the attainment of 
greater social and political participation, the establishment of greater social 
mobility, and support for industrialization and economic change. In many cases, 
however, this alliance proved to be only transitory. 
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Broad popular movements also arose in the period under review. In a number 
of countries they gained political importance, improved access to higher levels of 
consumption, and managed to secure the adoption of protective social legislation. 
Migration brought about a radical change in the urban situation in general 
and that of the working class in particular. The problems of incorporation into 
urban life predominated over those connected with industrial life, and the solution 
of the former was outside the possibilities of action of the trade unions, since 
it depended much more on overall government policies. This fact was not overlooked 
by the regimes of the time, and in many cases relationships of dependency of the 
trade union movement vis-a-vis the State were created. 
The agrarian problem was one of the sources of greatest concern, both because 
of its incidence in terms of the market for domestic industrial expansion and 
because of its role as a generator of foreign exchange and basic consumer goods, 
which were key elements in supporting urban and industrial growth. In most cases, 
the latter function predominated and the peasantry remained on the sidelines of the 
main channels of economic and social development. 
In the final analysis, the State played a leading role in economic and social 
change, although with some limitations. 
The shaping of an inward-oriented growth model under the leadership of the 
State and the existence of a favourable international climate basically account for 
the longest period of prosperity which Latin America has enjoyed since its 
independence. However, difficulties arose in this long process, and the problems 
which were later to emerge with some violence when the international economic crisis 
took place at the end of the 1970s were building up unnoticed all this time. 
The expansion of industrial development gradually began to run into obstacles 
of market size and access to external technology and capital; in response, proposals 
were put forward for economic integration and export promotion, rationalization 
of protection, and structural reforms, among them those concerning agriculture and 
taxes. 
On another level, the groups which had acquired some power were struggling to 
gain access to the fruits of growth, thus quite frequently creating serious political 
tensions. As the State's share in the product grew larger, it began to encounter 
limitations on its capacity to propel economic and social change and to reduce, 
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by means of transfers to the less favoured groups, the acute disparities in income 
distribution which accompanied an intensive process of capital formation. 
The main restriction which the action of the State ran into, however, was 
to arise later, as a result of the process of integration into the world economy 
at a time of recession in the latter and upsets in the international financial 
markets, 
b) 1965-1973 
As a result of the domestic economic and political difficulties described 
earlier, changes in the style of economic development which had prevailed up to 
that time began to take place in the mid-1960s in many countries of the region. 
This first attempt at change reached its culmination when the crisis that broke 
in 1973 and the important variations that took place on the international scene 
as from 1974 made it necessary to introduce qualitative changes in the styles of 
development. 
In this stage, some countries gradually altered their economic policies in 
an effort to take advantage of the dynamism of external trade and the appearance 
of new centres of international demand. Governments attached more importance to 
the promotion of exports, and at the same time, as current income and the 
balance-of-payments situation improved, they explored the possibility of liberalizing 
their imports and tended to unify their exchange rates. 
In many cases, reforms were also made in the policies and legislation 
affecting foreign capital, sometimes with the aim of regulating its role, but 
basically in order to encourage its entry. 
Industrialization continued to be a fundamental pillar of development, but 
it was oriented not only at the domestic market but also at the subregional, regional 
and world markets. A bigger impulse was given to the processing of natural resources 
and the incorporation of new branches producing consumer durables, intermediate 
inputs and capital goods. Agriculture was modernized so that technical progress 
could reach i"t more effectively, and in some countries greater emphasis was placed 
on diversifying exports of agricultural commodities. 
The functions of the State also tended to change. In some cases, an important 
role was assigned to public enterprises. In others, growing support was given to 
national private groups. Governments advanced in the planning of their activities; 
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although the planning was not always as effective as had been hoped, in a number 
of countries public action was gradually gaining as regards the coherence and 
clarity of its objectives,, and at the same time the handling of economic policy 
instruments was improved, both in the sphere of external trade and exchange 
policy and in that of fiscal and monetary policy. Control of inflation was a 
growing concern of many governments. Finally, domestic financial markets were 
encouraged and a growing linkage with the exterior was permitted. 
As already noted, up to 1973 the region registered quite dynamic economic 
growth and made changes which wrre by no means insignificant. Such a summary, 
however, conceals a wide range of results. 
Thus, obstacles to the subsequent advance of subregional integration processes 
rose and difficulties in the application of domestic reforms, particularly agrarian 
reform, became increasingly evident. At the same time, the role of some social 
groups in the political regimes was changing. In some cases, the armed forces and 
technocrats came to play more important roles. In others, an attempt was made to 
expand the popular base of political regimes by incorporating broad urban and 
rural groups. 
Changes on the political level were in many cases a reflection of the social 
difficulties encountered in trying to absorb a sufficient proportion of the growth 
in the urban labour force and to satisfy the consumption aspirations of the middle 
classes. There were undoubtedly difficulties in making room for the aspirations 
of certain groups. Thus, for example, in the case of the younger sectors there 
was an increase in the gap between their aspirations and their effective access to 
participation. 
In some cases, the reaction went to the other extreme, giving way to 
neoconservative-type economic approaches; sometimes the possibility of applying 
these new formulas was made easier by the existence of authoritarian political 
regimes. 
c) 1973-1980 
As from 1973, various phenomena in the international field —especially the 
increase in oil prices— brought about important changes in the economic picture 
in Latin America. For the countries which exported this product there was a 
substantial improvement in their terms of trade and a sharp increase in their 
/foreign exchange 
- 20 -
foreign exchange income. For the importing countries, however, there was the 
opposite effect, in that their terms of trade deteriorated and there was greater 
pressure on the balance of payments, not only because of the increase in oil 
prices but also because of the increases in the prices of imported manufactures due 
to simultaneous inflationary pressures in the developed countries. 
The increase in oil prices and a series of structural factors also altered 
the functioning of the international economy. There was a notable expansion in 
the role of the commercial banking system; the supply of financial resources for 
the developing countries significantly increased; warld inflation speeded up, and 
a little later interest rates rose also. 
The Latin American governments gained very easy access to this abundant 
international financing. External indebtedness with private sources grew sharply, 
and the banking system assumed an increasingly outstanding role both with regard 
to the balance of payments and the external debt and in the financing of the domestic 
economy. 
Loss of income by the population, inflation, and sometimes erosion of the 
legitimacy of governments were the effects of the first international crises (in 
the areas of monetary matters, oil and basic foods) in the 1970s, which culminated 
in the profound world recession of 19.74-1976. 
However, the evolution of external trade and external financing during the 
period 1976-1980 served to back up in some countries the conviction that the 
recessive phase of the international cycle had been overcome and that the world 
was returning to normality. During this period, exports grew in both volume and 
value at the fastest rates registered since the war. Imports also increased, in 
certain years at surprisingly rapid rates (in the Southern Cone countries and some 
net oil-exporting countries). At the same time, however, in most cases and years 
the trade deficit on goods and services was maintained. In general, the expansion 
of trade after the crisis was rapid but left a deficit. In this latter connection, 
the relationship between the production and financial sectors was redefined, and 
in some cases the first of these lost part of its relative importance vis-a-vis 
the second. 
In these circumstances, it was usual to find exceptionally large deficits 
on the balance-of-paymenls accounts covering transactions of goods and services. 
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These deficits were made possible, if not explained, by the availability of external 
financing which, as already noted, was offered in abundance to almost all the 
countries, initially at low real interest rates. 
In short, three factors common to the majority of the countries arose 
simultaneously in the evolution of external trade and financing; trade dynamism, 
a deficit on the goods and services account, and abundant net external financing. 
Thus, to the extent that it was possible to foresee a situation of rapid growth 
in the value of exports and low interest rates, it appeared perfectly justified 
to increase external indebtedness without running excessive risks as regards 
external payments capacity, while at the same time expanding the reserves. There 
was an appreciable degree of freedom in the area of economic policy and in the 
actual political measures of the governments. In fact, in many cases the exchange, 
credit, fiscal and international reserve policies helped to stimulate domestic 
spending, thus giving rise to a boom which stimulated imports and maae necessary 
new external financing. 
As from 1981, the facts gave the lie to the optimistic assumptions of the 
policies aimed at new forms of external economic and financial relations. In 
most cases, the balance-of-payments situation and the debt burden deteriorated 
to such a point that they provoked a profound growth crisis, one of whose most 
immediate manifestations was the increase in unemployment. 
The mirage of finding ways to circumvent the readjustments in the international 
economy had been based on two beliefs which later turned out to be false. On the 
one hand, it had been believed that the heavy external indebtedness would not give 
rise to subsequent restrictions, this view being based on optimistic assumptions 
regarding the evolution of international trade and inflation and of the domestic 
public finances. On the other, it had been thought that the obvious political and 
social costs of the 1974-1976 recession could be paid for through the economic 
growth which would derive from a new and simple form of insertion into the 
international economy. 
Hence, when the external situation changed, the crisis in the style of 
development which had been incubating in previous years became obvious. The 
dependence and vulnerability, although changing considerably in their form, got worse, 
and in many cases neither the State nor society at large were in a position to face 
up to them adequately. 
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2. Shortcomings and lags in the prevailing 
style of development 
The crisis which took place in the 1980s involved both long-term structural 
aspects and other short-term factors,, some of which have just been mentioned. The 
evolution of the Latin American economies during the long period following the war 
displayed important shortcomings, contradictions and lags. Outstanding among these 
were the gradual exhaustion of the dynamic impulse derived from the changes 
registered in the structure of production during the 1950s and 1960s; the inequitable 
distribution of the fruits of growth among the various segments of the population 
and among the various regions within each country, and the increasing loss of 
economic autonomy of the countries vis-a-vis the international economy. 
The challenges posed by the great changes which have taken place since the 
end of the war up to the present time have been magnified, likewise, by the vigorous 
population growth of Latin America and the Caribbean. The region's population more 
than doubled in these three decades. This rapid growth was accompanied by an even 
faster expansion in the urban population and an important spatial redistribution 
of inhabitants within the countries. Thus, in almost all of them the urban 
population now predominates, and in many it represents over two-thirds of the total 
population. Since the middle of the 1960s, however, a slackening in the population 
growth rate has been observed as declines in fertility became more general and the 
decline in mortality slowed down. At all events, it is impossible to overlook 
the effects that these dynamic processes of population growth, redistribution and 
urbanization have had on the magnitude of the efforts that governments have had 
to make in order to generate employment and provide basic services (health, 
education and infrastructure) for a growing and youthful population, and to 
subsidize some essential goods and services, notably food and transport, 
a) Changes in the structure of production 
The traditional institutions, conduct and technologies of production were 
partially reformed or replaced by others. Industrialization and agricultural 
modernization, urbanization and the action of the State disseminated technical 
progress, changed the structure of production and employment and modified the 
social strucutre, with the emergence of middle-level and working class urban groups. 
These changes did not eliminate the distributive heterogeneity, however, nor did 
they always lead to democratic modernization. 
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The change in the structure of production was correlative with institutional 
change. From a situation where the traditional hacienda, family enterprises and 
craft workshops predominated, there was a transition to another where a large part 
of production was organized around modern enterprises —public and private— which 
in some cases achieved an appreciable size and were increasingly linked with 
international markets. Foreign direct investments, previously concentrated in 
infrastructural activities and the exploitation and marketing of natural resources, 
gradually moved into industrial development and modern agricultural production. 
In the 1970s, moreover, national financial markets developed within a vast 
process of liberalization and integration with world financial centres. In some 
countries the external credit flows fed the national financial systems, while in 
others the international banking system made up for the weakness of domestic 
financial institutions and circuits. 
Public action became more effective, with industrialization and agricultural 
modernization policies, the creation of infrastructure, and improvements in the 
handling of economic policies (tax and tariff reforms, more intensive use of 
exchange policies). Government enterprises played a role of the greatest importance 
in changing the structure of production of many countries, without this fact 
involving any limitation of public support to the entrepreneurial sector. 
Industry grew, diversified and generally became more efficient; its share 
in the total product rose from 17% to 24% between 1950 and 1980. Import substitution 
made possible economic growth even in periods of recession in external trade. The 
expansion of the industrial sector was accompanied by a gradual change in its 
structure. The production of non-durable consumer goods was followed by the 
development of branches producing" intermediate inputs, consumer durables and capital 
goods, especially in the larger countries. In this way, domestic production came 
to satisfy, almost the entire demand for consumer goods and a significant and 
growing part of the demand for basic intermediate goods and capital goods. 
This process also showed deficiencies, however. Excessive protection or 
the absence of stimuli for domestic competition created a class of industrial 
entrepreneurs who were to some extent divorced from the pressures of technological 
change and efficiency of production, while they were highly dependent in their 
investment decisions on government expenditure and policy trends. A strong 
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technological dependency thus grew up, combined with scanty creative capacity; 
the articulation of the different branches remained limited; the development of 
the capital goods sector lagged behind; and a strong imbalance in the external 
trade in manufactures persisted. 
Agriculture was changed with the introduction of new production techniques , 
and progress in organization and in the marketing of products. Modern agriculture 
was capitalized and benefited from the public investments in irrigation and 
transport infrastructure, new technologies were incorporated on a massive scale, 
linkages were established with urban and external markets, and important 
agro-industrial activities were developed. At the same time, however, peasant 
agriculture (on which a high proportion of the rural population depends) continued 
to exist almost without any improvements in productivity, and it was still only 
capable of providing low levels of living, in most cases below the critical poverty 
line. Moreover, the relative share of the region's agriculture in world trade 
tended to decline, while it did not prove possible to consolidate to the full 
the intra-regional exchange of agricultural products, 
b) Equity and participation 
As regards the satisfaction of the objectives of economic equity, recent 
Latin American history shows a complex picture of achievements, setbacks and 
limitations. 
In the area of income distribution, no clear improvements in the overall 
measurement coefficients were observed, nor were any to be noted in connection 
with the least favoured groups. It is particularly disappointing that even in 
the periods following booms in the capital formation process there is no evidence 
of any substantial improvement, nor has it been possible to share on an equitable 
basis the costs of the present economic contraction. 
The overall considerations, however, conceal big differences between social ... -
groups. In urban areas, the middle level sectors appropriated appreciable percentages 
of the income and participated actively in the political life of the countries. 
At the same time, in the great metropolises significant groups of the population 
still live in conditions of extreme poverty. The 5% of the population with the 
highest income, for its part, has managed to maintain if not to increase its share 
of total income. 
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No less significant, in many countries, was the evolution in rural areas. 
The incorporation of the modern entrepreneurial sector and the dissemination of 
technological advances in agricultural production is modifying the structure and 
functioning of rural society and increasing its integration with the rest of the 
system, while at the same time increasing the differentiation between business 
agriculture and traditional or peasant agriculture. 
With regard to employment and unemployment, various facts are to be noted. 
The labour force has increased rapidly as a consequence of the high population 
growth rate and greater participation in the labour market. Moreover, the heavy 
rural-urban migration, together with the prevailing pattern of development, has 
prevented modern urban activities —although they have absorbed large contingents 
of labour— from being able to generate sufficient productive jobs to match the 
great supply of labour. This relative insufficiency explains the growth of 
informal activities, where urban underemployment is concentrated. 
Towards the beginning of the 1970s, about 40% of the population was living 
in conditions of critical poverty, and it does not seem that there have been any 
substantial improvements since then. 
The great changes characteristic of development processes —among them 
urbanization and the introduction of technical progress— normally cause great 
disparities and social imbalances. The emergence of new developments in contrast 
with the traditional situation is not a phenomenon which is exclusive to Latin 
America and the Caribbean. The special features of the distributive and social 
heterogeneity of the region are its intensity and persistence, even at times when 
the dynamism of economic change raised hopes that they might be reduced. In 
Latin America, partly because of the demonstration effect of the standards 
prevailing in the industrialized centres and the growing demands for capitalization 
of the modern sectors of the economy, the differences separating the modern strata 
from those which are still sunk in traditional structures tends to persist or even 
become more evident. Here, the dissemination of the fruits of technical progress 
tends to run into new obstacles which are later crystallized into very inequitable 
social structures. 
Nevertheless, education (in which great advances have been made) has become 
a way whereby people can become integrated into national society and it has also 
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become a channel for social mobility. In many countries, almost all children are 
now in school, and university education has become a mass phenomenon. Illiteracy 
tends to be residual in a number of countries; in spite of this, however, there are 
still high proportions of illiterates in the rural population (and especially the 
indigenous rural population) of a fair number of countries. Nor has it been 
possible to give the entire population a complete cycle of basic schooling. Higher 
education has been expanded in some countries to levels comparable with those of 
European nations, although there are clear deficiencies in academic quality. Basic 
education has provided opportunities for broad sectors which were previously 
marginated, but it has not been given sufficient priority or, of course, resources, 
to enable the entire population t* be provided with a minimum of necessary knowledge 
and balance the various educational cycles, including higher education. 
Economic growth, industrializatiox , agricultural modernization, technological 
and cultural change and urbanization have brought about great changes in the 
stratification of the Latin American societies. Great sectors of society have 
taken part in the process of social mobilization by passing from rural to urban 
status. These changes, as well as representing tangible advantages for the rising 
social classes, have also enabled them to cross symbolic and historical barriers 
of social separation. 
As the structures of production tend to become stabilized, their impact on 
social stratification becomes slower and such stratification comes to depend more 
on the distribution of income, culture and power, 
c) The degree of autonom}' in external economic relations 
In the years immediately after the war it was hoped that changes in production 
would make it possible to increase both the autonomy of the countries in their 
external decisions, and their technological and productive self-sufficiency. 
By 1980, primary exports had bean -diversified and other exports of semi-
manufactured and manufactured goods had been incorporated. At the sare time, there 
was a tendency to the elimination of imports of consumer goods, and many imports 
and capital goods were substituted with national Products. Exports still show a 
high proportion of primary commodities, however, and the supply of technology and 




The expansion of the field of action of the transnational corporations added 
a new and less visible element to the external dependency of the Latin American 
production process. 
The most notable change in the form of external relations took place during 
the 1970s in the financial field. Faced with domestic problems and an ample supply 
of external financing, governments liberalized their international economic relations, 
although to very different degrees. Private banking and commercial sources 
channelled big flows of financing to the region. Loans from abroad came to play 
an active role in both investment and everyday activity; they greatly exceeded 
direct foreign investment in amount; they replaced or supplemented long-term loans 
from multinational financial institutions intended for big investments in physical 
and industrial infrastructure, which had now to be carried out with medium- and 
short-term loans; and they provided the external savings needed to close the 
balance-of-payments deficit. 
Thus, the transnational banking system penetrated deeply into the economy of 
the Latin American countries. In many cases, governments lost control of the 
external financial flows as the degree of vulnerability of their economies increased. 
There was a noticeable increase in the asymmetrical nature of financial relations. 
The fixing of interest rates and decisions on the availability of funds became 
increasingly out of the range of action of the Latin American countries' policies. 
In short, although industrialization sometimes increased the autonomy of 
decision-making, generally there was no substantial change in the degree of 
technological dependence or in the asymmetrical nature of external trade and 
financial relations. The restrictions in these aspects became obvious at a higher 
level of development, however, 
d) The persistent heterogeneity 
The intensive changes typical of development processes, such as urbanization 
and the introduction of technical progress, normally generate great imbalances. 
In these circumstances, it is normal to expect great initial differences in 
productivity between the new and traditional activities and the emergence of social 
strata which are appreciably different from the traditional ones. 
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In the following sections, some factors which seem to be specially important 
in the generation and maintenance of the heterogeneity of the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries will be highlighted. This list, which does not pretend to be 
exhaustive, in no sense gainsays the differences existing between the countries of . 
the region or'the consequent diversity as regards the relative weight and form of 
incidence of the factors in question in each case. 
In the first place, the process of economic and social change comes within the 
framework of the centre-periphery relation, whereby the centre transfers to the 
periphery its habits of consumption and technology. In the periphery, the habits 
of consumption are adopted by many social groups, especially those of middle and 
high income, even though their per capita income is much less than that of the central 
countries. This transfer —stimulated by the advances in mass communication at the 
international level— is extremely dynamic and has meant a tremendous challenge for 
the peripheral countries. It presents great demands for imports and capital and 
creates difficulties for carrying out production on competitive conditions, because 
of the small scales involved. This means that industrial development based on this 
pattern is limited by the external bottleneck, by the shortage of savings, and by the 
difficulty in winning external markets, which would demand suitable competitive 
capacity. 
Secondly, the capacity of the system to absorb the available labour depends on 
the magnitude and nature of the accumulation process, as well as on the growth and 
composition of the labour force. As already noted, the peripheral countries, through 
their imports of capital goods, absorbed the same type of technology prevailing in 
the centres, albeit with some delay and in a distorted and incomplete manner. The use 
of a common type of technology, based on automation, however, calls for a much greater 
effort of domestic saving in relation to income on the periphery than in the centre. 
This difficulty, of itself, militates against the reduction of heterogeneity on the 
periphery. 
Thirdly, the industrialization process has not always been directed with a 
long-term viev. On the contrary, it has tended to satisfy in relatively short periods 
a level of consumption which has been depressed by external trade crises or else a 
slightly higher level whose consolidation in the medium term depends on economic 
policy measures. The obstacle to the satisfaction of this type of consumption, 
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increasingly inspired by that of the centres, lay in balance-of-payments problems 
or in the relative stagnation of the income and demand of the high and middle-income 
groups which guaranteed the profitability of industries producing consumer durables. 
This limited the capacity of the industrialization process to influence the employ-
ment structure with a sustained process of accumulation aimed at the intermediate 
and capital goods branches. Furthermore, the persistence of underemployment or even 
open unemployment reduced the possibility of a continued increase in income for 
working class groups. Thus, the established form of distribution of income and 
economic power has ended by guiding the changes in production, and groups which 
represent only a small percentage of the population have controlled the bulk of the 
increases in demand. 
Furthermore, heterogeneity has been manifested not only in the division 
between modernizing and traditional social forces, but also frequently within the 
first-named of these; thus, in most cases the renovatory regimes have included 
traditional and modern elements, both in the social forces which served as their 
support and in their principles of orientation and action. This heterogeneity 
—aggravated by the number of social groups making them up— prevented these regimes 
from following a clear path; they always seemed to be overwhelmed by the need to 
solve short-term problems, satisfy pressing demands and reconcile opposing interests. 
This latter factor is clearly reflected in their industrialization policy, which, 
although constituting the backbone of their economic programme, never attained the 
impetus, permanence or time horizon necessary for definitively overcoming the old 
regime. 
In short, there have been functional links between economic and social change, 
the dynamism of this, and heterogeneity. 
Thus, incorporation and marginality, modernization and heterogeneity tend to 
be reproduced, and their coexistence becomes a permanent characteristic of the 
functioning of this style of development. 
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3. The economic crisis from 1981 to 1984 
a) Scope 
Between 1981 and 1984, Latin America suffered (and continues to suffer) from 
the severest and most prolonged recession since the great crisis of the 1930s. 
This situation was all the more spectacular because it occurred after four years in 
which the economic growth rate of the region had reached an average of 5.5%. As 
already noted, the fact is that this growth had had limitations, especially as regards 
income distribution, employment and the relative degree of autonomy vis-a-vis the 
exterior. Nevertheless, the region had managed to emerge from the oil crisis after 
1973 with only a reduction in its growth (unlike the OECD countries, whose production 
declined). 
Beginning in 1981, the real per capita income fell for three consecutive years, 
and finally bottomed out in 1984 at a level 8% below that of 1980 and only equivalent 
to that already reached in 1977. Although there were substantial differences 
between countries, there was a general decline in per capita income which affected 
17 of the 19 countries of the region for which statistics are available. The crisis 
affected all types of countries: large and small, oil exporters and non-oil exporters, 
countries whose economies were relatively more centrally directed or which were 
oriented rather towards the market, countries with export-oriented development 
strategies or strategies mainly directed towards the domestic market. 
When the period of profound recession began, the contraction in the gross 
domestic product was accompanied by serious financial imbalances which were, reflected 
in the balance-of-payments current account, fiscal deficits and inflationary tensions. 
As from 1983, the external imbalances eased to some extent: the deficit on current 
account went down from nearly US$ 40 billion in 1981 (i.e., over 40% of exports) to 
only US$ 2 billion in 1984, and the trade balance, which showed a deficit of US$ 2 
billion in 1981, recovered to show a surplus of US$ 38 billion in 1984. Although 
this result was heavily influenced by the performance of two countries --Mexico and 
Brazil— it nevertheless reflects the trends prevailing in most of the countries. 
The counterpart to the improvement in the trade balance, however, was not only the 
above-mentioned recession —with its accompanying increase in open unemployment and 
underemployment— but also the trebling of the rate of inflation, which averaged 
almost 180% in 1984. As was to be expected, the economic recession, accompanied 
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by unprecedented inflation, caused a sharp decline in real wages in most 
countries. 
b) Origins 
In the unleashing of the crisis, a part was played both by the long-term 
structural factors described above and the short-term ones associated with the 
external imbalance. The event that triggered off the crisis was the effort made to 
correct this external imbalance in too short a time. It was the region's inability 
to gain access to significant capital flows which prevented it from gaining time 
in order to promote an efficient adjustment based on a change in the structure of 
production instead of its limitation or reduction. 
In order to understand why Latin America (with substantial differences from 
country to country) became so heavily indebted and consequently had so little room 
for manoeuvre it is necessary to look at the less immediate origins of the crisis. 
As already noted, the adjustment to the increased oil prices in 1973 and the sub-
sequent world recession were gradual processes and were consequently expansive 
rather than sudden and recessive, and they were financed largely through the 
recycling of petrodollars. In some countries, the adjustment (although gradual) 
was complete; in others it was only partial or was even postponed. Two opposing 
orientations in economic policy carried special weight, in different countries or 
different periods, in the generation of the crisis: excessively expansive spending 
policies and monetarist-type policies based on extensive opening-up to the exterior. 
The prolonged application of these two orientations had a common element: excessive 
dependence of growth on external indebtedness. At all events, as the indebtedness 
had already been used to reduce the effects of external changes, the debt/export 
ratio was already dangerously high in 1979, when the second oil crisis took place. 
Furthermore, the world recession was precipitated by the attempts of the 
industrialized countries to abruptly contain the resurgence of inflation to which 
the unexpected doubling of oil prices had contributed. There was thus a decline in 
the imports of the central countries and hence a weakening of the demand for the 
exports of the periphery, with a sharp fall in the latter's terms of trade. Moreover, 
as the stabilization of prices in all the OECD countries was centered on a very 
restrictive monetary policy, national and hence international interest rates rose. 
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Political pressures, or the belief that world growth would be maintained 
(1981) or that the recovery would soon begin (1982), led many countries to continue 
to increase their indebtedness or draw down their reserves in an attempt to prevent 
the adjustment from being entirely recessive, as had been successfully achieved in 
1974. Even the oil-exporting countries, which did not face serious restrictions in 
their external relations, resorted to the expedient of increasing their indebtedness 
in order to achieve higher rates of economic expansion. Consequently, between 1980 
and 1982 the region's debt grew by almost US$ 100 billion (i.e., by nearly 50%). This 
indebtedness was frequently encouraged by the liberal supply of funds made available 
by the international banking system. 
The abundance of external financing also made it possible to use exchange rates 
in order to control inflation instead of maintaining an external balance, or else 
to use them to finance unsustainable levels of fiscal expenditure. In general, the 
slowness of most of the countries of the region in adjusting their domestic economic 
policy to the changing circumstances of the international economy magnified the 
financial imbalances. Among many other consequences of the lag in the implementation 
of new policies was a considerable flight of capital, further encouraged by factors 
of non-economic origin in some countries. Furthermore, the loans obtained were not 
always well invested; indeed, in some cases they were not invested at all but were 
spent on imports of non-essential consumer goods and military equipment or else 
simply went back abroad to swell the private accounts maintained in international 
financial centres. 
However, these phenomena are merely the superficial expression of deeper changes 
which have been gaining ground in the international economy. The integration of 
markets, the remodelling of comparative advantages, or the emergence of new spearhead 
sectors, also at the worldwide level, are inevitably reflected in tensions and 
changes which have a disproportionately great effect on the developing countries. 
Likewise, many of the economies of the region, apart from having exhausted the 
margins of manoeuvre available for the defence of domestic development vis-a-vis the 
extraordinary rearrangements of the international economy which took place in the 




Consequently, the unexpectedly long durat ion of the recession in the central 
countries checked the growth of export volumes and reduced export prices to such an 
extent that by 1982 the debt/export ratio had reached three to one. Taking into 
account this decline in payment capacity, which was accentuated by the unexpected 
increase in the interest rates on international loans, the proportion between 
interest payments and exports doubled in only two years and came to nearly 40% in 
1982. In some countries, this phenomenon coincided with unsustainable lags in the 
handling of exchange and financial policy, reflected in a chain of abrupt devalua-
tions which increased the burden of servicing the external debt in local currency 
terms. In 1982, the temporary interruption in the servicing of the Mexican external 
debt, together with other factors, suddenly dried up the availability of outside 
financial resources. 
As from 1982, Latin America suddenly became a net exporter of resources. This 
negative transfer was very heavy —of the order of 25% of the value of exports in the 
period 1982-1984— after having been positive at the rate of about 13% in the three 
previous years. It is difficult to exaggerate the unfavourable repercussions of 
this procyclical change which, to make matters worse, coincided with an average 
annual drop of 5% in the terms of trade, 
c) Reactions in the area of economic policy 
In the face of such a marked external imbalance, and in view of the impossibil-
ity of spreading the adjustment over a longer time because of the contraction in 
external financing, most of the countries of the region were obliged to save foreign 
exchange rapidly. Emphasis was placed on restricting global demand by applying 
traditional policies —reduction of public spending, restrictive credit policies, 
reduction of real wages— and greater priority was given to exchange adjustments and 
export incentives. In almost all cases, the governments applied both sets of policies 
together, and in a few countries changes were also promoted in the structure of 
investment in order to substitute imports and increase exports. Most of the adjust-
ment programmes were worked out and put into practice under the auspices of 
agreements signed with the IMF. 
Through the adjustment programmes and the renegotiation of debts tiie external 
imbalance was indeed reduced, but at the cost of a severe contraction in the level of 
economic activity. The current account deficit was practically eliminated in two 
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years, and a substantial surplus was generated on the trade account (US$ 40 billion 
in only three years). Obviously, however, an improvement of this magnitude in such 
a short time was more the result of a policy of reduction of imports (which caused 
a contraction in production) than of a policy aimed at structural transformation 
favourable to development. In these two years, the volume of imports went down by 
40%, which affected not only imports of luxury goods, but also the purchase of 
essential machinery and intermediate inputs. 
Consequently, the reduction of the external imbalance has been unsatisfactory, 
since it was not accompanied by a substantial increase in the production of 
tradeable goods, either in order to increase exports or to substitute imports. 
As already noted, the countries of the region acted in this way because they 
had already used up all the types of freedom of action at their disposal and 
because the interruption of the flows of finance prevented them from carrying out 
the rearrangement process more gradually. While it is true that the various rounds 
of debt renegotiations between 1982 and 1984 prevented an international financial 
crisis of disastrous proportions, they did not have the scope needed to facilitate 
the essential restructuring of the Latin American economies. Consequently, the 
advantages of the adjustment programmes largely benefited the centre, whereas the 
negative effects fell above all on the debtors nations. 
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II. PRESENT CONSTRAINTS AND FUTURE CONDITIONING FACTORS 
1. The external context 
The foreseeable evolution of the international economy during the coming years would 
appear to offer fewer opportunities to the Latin American and Caribbean countries 
than during the period following the war, while in contrast it will bring with it 
serious restrictions. The intensification of technological change, alterations in 
the magnitude and structure of international trade and changes in the rules governing 
that trade have made the old international division of labour obsolete, without yet 
clearly indicating how the Latin American and Caribbean countries can be incorporated 
into the new scheme. Furthermore, it is to be expected that there will be 
substantial restrictions on the availability of public and private financial resources. 
In short, it would be unrealistic to expect that the external context will offer 
sufficient dynamic stimuli to the region to attain growth rates comparable with 
those of the past; indeed, even taking advantage of the opportunities that this 
new environment may offer will call for great efforts on the part of the countries 
to adapt themselves to the changing circumstances of the international economy, 
a) The growth and economic policies of the developed countries 
Estimates by various institutions coincide in forecasting that the growth 
rates of the industrialized countries up to the end of the present decade will 
continue to be rather below the historical levels; that the rates of inflation in 
those countries will go down compared with those registered in recent years, and 
that the nominal interest rates in international financing markets could show a 
slight reduction. They also coincide in forecasting that the trade restrictions 
in the industrial countries will not undergo any significant relief in the years to 
come and may even get worse in certain branches of activity, such as steel, where 
several of those countries have been losing their capacity to compete. It can 
also be assumed that oil prices will not change much in real terms and that the 
terms of trade of the developing countries will in the best of cases show a slight 
improvement in 1984-1985 and afterwards remain constant up to the end of the decade. 
It is estimated1, that the financing needs of the United States and other 
industrial countries will absorb a considerable part of the resources available on 
world financial markets. These resources, which may be smaller than those of 
the' 1970s because of the change in the structure of the current account surplus 
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between the various countries in the world, will only permit a very slight increase 
in the net financing supplied by the private sector to developing countries, in 
comparison with past experience. It is also estimated that official development aid 
will not grow in real terms, or will grow only very slightly and then only for 
certain countries of the region. 
There appear to be important differences as regards the flexibility of each 
developed economy to adapt itself to the changes which are taking place in the 
international economy; this flexibility influences the capacity to compete and the 
dynamism of production and exports. 
Today, the United States and Japan seem to be the countries with the best 
possibilities of modernizing and adapting their productive systems to the changes 
in the structure of demand and carrying out changes in the spheres of technology 
and production. In contrast, some European countries seem to show greater 
resistance to such changes, so that the modernization will be slower, with negative 
consequences for their capacity to compete. 
In short, it seems reasonable to expect a moderate and less steady recovery 
of the developed economies, with greater unemployment and with more accentuated 
protectionist tendencies than in the decades following the Second World War. 
For Latin America, this could mean an incomplete recovery of demand for its 
exports, accompanied by instability and uncertainty. 
As regards the availability of international financial resources, it may be 
assumed that the amounts available will be considerably less than in past eras 
and that it will also be necessary to compete with the demand of developed countries 
and a probable predispositon to give preference to certain Asian countries whose 
levels of indebtedness are lower than those of Latin America. 
b) Changes in technology and production in the developed countries: alterations 
in historical comparative advantages 
A second phenomenon which is taking place in the developed countries and has 
important repercussions fcr Latin America is the rapid introduction of new 
technologies for the production of goods and services, with decided government 
support. This is taking place, for example, in such fields as microelectronics5 
robotization; computer control of production processes; data processing; long 
distance transmission of information; biotechnology and genetic engineering; 
techniques, processes and equipment which make it possible to save energy or 
replace fossil fuels; and new light and strong materials. 
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These new technologies favour the production processes of the developed 
countries; the levels of their costs; the management and accounting of 
enterprises; the quality of the goods produced, and also the centralized management 
and control of branch enterprises, thus permitting greater expansion of enterprises 
into the markets of other countries and industrial integration on a worldwide scale. 
In the long term, these same technologies reduce the advantages of countries 
which have abundant labour and natural resources, make it possible to bring lower-
quality resources into production, and increase the precision and quality of 
manufactures. 
The other important aspect of the changes which are taking place in the 
economies of the developed countries is the growth of 3ervices. These include 
some connected with the so-called information technology, which help to raise 
productivity in both goods-producing activities and engineering services, banking, 
financial institutions and insurance. There is also rapid growth in some services 
connected with tourism and recreation. In contrast, some traditional services are 
tending to lose relative importance, especially retail trade in specialized lines, 
as a result of the competititon of big integrated stores. 
The developed countries show active interest in penetrating the markets of 
the developing countries with their service activities. The most notable case is 
that of the United States, which has taken a very firm position over the 
liberalization of international flows of services, calling for these to be 
incorporated in the GATT rules as a way of preventing the application of protection 
and promotion policies at the national level. 
Although it is not yet possible to appraise exactly the impact of the new 
technologies on the competitiveness of Latin America and other developing areas, 
it is all too obvious that these technologies could reduce the comparative 
advantages of Latin America which serve as the basis for the old international 
division of labour in production processes making intensive use of latour or 
natural resources. These considerations make it necessary to reassert the 
importance of the efforts that should be made at the national and regional levels 
in the coming decade in the area of technological development, 
c) Changes in the institutionality of international trade 
The third important aspect concerns the institutional changes,in world trade. 
The problems of the recession, unemployment and the balance of payments favour some 
de facto changes in the rules governing world trade. They reduce the effectiveness 
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of the application of the most-favoured-nation clause which is the basis of 
GATT (in the case of many goods which are of interest for Latin America, this 
clause tends to become the exception rather than the rule). Multilateralism 
and free trade are gradually being partly replaced by bilateral arrangements and 
managed trade (as has been sanctioned to some extent by GATT with the adoption of 
the Multifibres Agreement). There is also an increase in the number of important 
negotiations and decisions connected with trade which are carried out outside the 
ambit of GATT, with the limited participation of specific groups of countries. 
Protectionism is becoming a phenomenon with moveable limits: it does not 
cover just a fixed list of sectors, but keeps on incorporating others where the 
impact of the exports of the developing countries introduces unwanted competition 
into the markets of the developed economies. In addition to the immediate 
negative effects on Latin American exports, this phenomenon creates an atmosphere 
of great uncertainty as regards the policies of the Latin American countries 
covering production and specialization for external trade. In addition, there are 
the promotional measures which the developed exporting countries apply in branches 
which compete with Latin American products, and the application of the principle 
of graduation, whereby a number of countries of the region are receiving less 
favourable treatment than other developing countries, 
d) The transnationalization of the international economy 
Fourthly, the transnationalization of the world economy must be highlighted. 
In this respect, many important decisions are at least partially beyond the control 
of national governments. This phenomenon has various aspects: the great economic 
power acquired by the transnational corporations and their capacity to shift 
production activities from one country to another; the growth in linkages between 
countries which subject each of them to greater external influences and condition 
their possibilities of applying autonomous economic policies; the growing dispersion 
of industrial production, which has been split up among various countries through 
subcontracting; the formation of international financial markets, such as the 
Eurodollar market; and the leading role played by the great international banks, 
which considerably reduces the regulatory capacity of governments over a broad 
spectrum of financial operations. 
The repercussions of the transnationalization of the economies of the 
developing countries are complex. They will have to learn to operate in a less 
orderly world, with vagues rules, than that governed by the Bretton Woods Agreement, 
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with new risks —and opportunities— and greater uncertainty as regards the future. 
The transnational corporations are important agents for the transfer of technology 
to the Latin American and Caribbean countries and for giving them access to external 
markets, but at the s.^ me time they raise the problem of the articulation of their 
forms of action and operations with national development policies, 
e) Trends in the world power system 
In the last forty years there has been a diversification of the actors and 
levels on which international economic activity is carried on. The European 
countries, and even more so Japan, have become important economic competitors for 
the United States in merchandise trade, financial intermediation, technology, 
direct investment and services connected with production. The transnational 
corporations have acquired the capacity to take actions and decisions which are 
largely beyond the control of the economic policy of any individual country. 
In recent years, the competition of the newly industrialized countries of Asia 
and Latin America has become important in international manufactures markets. 
National societies are becoming more diversified and pursuing an increasingly 
broad variety of objectives, many of which depend on what goes on in the outside 
world. The list of issues of international concern has become less clearly ordered 
and more complex. The State is losing part of its effectiveness in the handling 
of external relations, and new agents are beginning to intervene, bringing into 
play non-traditional power resources. The atmosphere of co-operation which inspired 
international relations in the 1960s has now faded away. 
The trends at the various levels on which the world power system is analysed 
—economic, cultural, political and military— are acquiring new and more complex 
forms of mutual linkage, and they are affected by the projects put into effect by 
the large and medium-sized powers in order to increase their relative weight. 
The impression that steady progress was being made towards a multipolar world has 
been subject to limitations on various planes, and situations have been observed 
in which the reassertion of multipolarity is accompanied by events which would 
seem to suggest a return to the previous bipolarity. 
2. The burden of the external debt 
The main immediate constraint on their economic reactivation which the Latin American 
countries have to face is the overwhelming burden of the external debt. The high 
debt/export ratio is one of the main features giving the Latin American economic 
crisis special characteristics compared with those of other developing countries. 
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The balance of the disbursed external debt of the countries of the region grew 
rapidly from lTS$ 150 billion in 1978 to over lTS$ 360 billion in 1984. Within it, 
financing from private banks on commercial conditions as regards repayment terms 
and interest rates has been assuming increasing relative importance. Due to the 
combined effects of the increased indebtedness, the deterioration in its structure 
and the evolution of interest rates, since 1982 the region has had to devote 
between 35% and 40% of the foreign exchange generated by its exports of goods and 
services to the payment of interest (in some countries, this proportion has even been 
over 50%). In view of the magnitude of the problem, most of the countries had to 
embark on negotiations in order to reschedule their commitments, thus deferring 
in time —but not eliminating— the heavy burden of debt servicing. 
The adverse influence of this situation on economic reactivation is obvious. 
Even the countries which have achievt i the most favourable conditions in their 
renegotiations have to devote a very significant proportion of the foreign exchange 
generated by their exports —sometimes nearly 50%— to the servicing of the 
external debt. Secondly, as long as this problem persists —and it must be expected 
that it will continue for many years— the possibility of gaining access to new 
financing is severely restricted. Thirdly, this has strongly conditioned the 
management of economic policy in most of the countries, even causing reactivation 
to be subordinated to the need to generate trade surpluses in order to meet the 
debt commitments. Furthermore, this topic occupies a predominant place in the 
attention of those formulating economic policy, sometimes at the expense of other 
aspects which are closer to the subject of development itself. Finally, the debt 
problem introduces great uncertainty into the immediate and medium-term prospects, 
because of the different paths that the renegotiations could take or the different 
possible answers to the query on how to relieve the effects of the lack of outside 
f inancing. 
In short, as long as the majority of the countries of the region continue to 
be obliged to devcte a high proportion of their foreign exchange to debt servicing, 
any attempt at reactivation and development will run into formidable obstacles. 
Although there is a possibility that the problem may be somewhat relieved —at 
least in relative terns— in proportion as exports increase, there are no grounds 
(as already noted) for expecting a favourable external environment which would 
permit all the countries of the region to raise their exports at sufficiently rapid 
rates to bring about an appreciable reduction in the incidence of debt servicing. 
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3. The domestic situation 
As well as the constraints of external origin described above, there are others 
of domestic origin. Prominent among these are a group of structural shortcomings 
(lack of articulation of production activities, inefficiency, technological 
backwardness, weakness of management, inadequate training of labour, unsuitable 
forms of insertion into international markets, etc.) which reduce the capacity 
of the Latin American economies to adapt to the crisis and find suitable responses 
to it. As a result, the crisis continues to grow deeper and to bring about a series 
of unfavourable effects, some of the most important of which (with natural differences 
from one country to another) are the erosion of real income and deficiencies in the 
supply of the most basic consumer goods to the population; the deterioration of 
levels of saving and accumulation; the repressed demand for imported inputs, and the 
narrowing of the freedom of manoeuvre of economic policy itself. 
As regards the erosion of real income, it has already been noted that in the 
region as a whole the per capita gross domestic product went down for three years 
running (1981-1983) and virtually stagnated in 1984, so that it returned to the 
levels already registered in 1977. For many countries, the situation was even more 
dramatic: over half of them continued to register negative per capita growth rates 
in 1984, while in others the real per capita income sank to levels comparable to 
those of the early 1970s or even before. Other manifestations of the marked 
decline in material well-being are to be found in the evolution of urban unemployment, 
which, in most of the countries with statistical registers, doubled between 1978 and 
1984 on top of the sharp fall in real wages, which in many cases amounted to over 
30% during the last two years. 
The deterioration in the standard of living of the Latin American ani Caribbean 
population has economic, political and social repercussions. Even if a certain 
dynamism in the growth rate of the economies were recovered for a relatively long 
period, this would only make possible the gradual recovery of previous levels, 
rather than any significant increase in them. 
Future trends in demographic dynamics, as regards population growth, structure 
and spatial distribution, are conditioning factors which cannot be left out of 
the reckoning when evaluating these possibilities. This is because of the inertia 
of demographic processes and because some aspects of this dynamics are already 
predetermined. /A second 
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A second limiting factor for future development lies in the reduction in 
the flows of savings and investment, and even in the stock of capital. The 
regional investment coefficient went down from 25% in 1975 to 17% in 1984: a figure 
comparable to that registered in the 1950s. 
Consequently, it is necessary to emphasize the vital importance, for the 
future development of the countries of the region, of restoring saving and 
investment to level-? in keeping with the revitalization and adaptation of regional 
production capacity. Although it is true that in a first stage some reactivation 
could be promoted by using the existing production capacity to the full —while 
another potential asset is the deposits and investments abroad which are the 
counterpart of the flight of capital— the countries of the region can hardly 
modernize and articulate their productive sectors without increasing the capacity 
for mobilizing savings and investing them in real priority activities. This is a 
difficult task in view of the unfavourable prospects for procuring significant 
amounts of external savings, while the mobilization of domestic savings will run 
up against the lags in consumption already referred to in previous paragraphs. 
Furthermore, as a result of the contraction in the levels of consumption and 
investment, and possibly also of a deliberate iir.port substitution effort, in 
recent years the region has managed to significantly compress its import coefficients. 
In some cases, especially in the large countries, these coefficients have dropped 
to minimal levels, so that it may be expected that any attempt at economic 
reactivation will be accompanied by a vigorous upsurge in imports, thus once again 
creating restrictions on the growth capacity, unless at the same time there is an 
expansion in exports or an increase in external financing. 
Finally, the above-mentioned limitations of internal and external origin 
hive been reflected in a systematic narrowing of the room for manoeuvre in the 
handling of economic policy. Thus, the drop in the international monetary reserves, 
the burden of the external debt, and austerity in public spending have tended to 
weaken the leading role of the State and accentuate the vulnerability of the 
economies. 
4. Social tensions and the movement towards democracy 
Finally, among the factors conditioning Latin American development, mention must 
be made of the political context. Here, there are two diametrically opposed 
situations: in some countries (the.majority), and in contrast to what happened 
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during the depression of the 1930s, the economic crisis coincided with or opened 
the way to a process of democratization reflected in the return to power of 
constitutionally elected civil governments. In others (especially in some Central 
American countries)p the economic crisis coincided and was interrelated with a 
serious political and social crisis. 
This latter phenomenon becomes a restriction, in the final analysis, since 
the recovery of certain norms of social coexistence is a requisite for restoring 
minimum levels of saving and investment, checking the flight of capital and even of 
human resources, and establishing the basic conditions to facilitate economic 
reactivation. 
With the movement towards democracy, one of the longest-postponed aspirations 
for the modernization of the Latin American societies has been fulfilled. However, 
this has taken place at a time when it has not been possible to satisfy other 
objectives, such as growth, equitable distribution of income, and correction of 
external vulnerability. The recent democratization, which is the result of a 
complex set of interrelated factors of national and international origin, must be 
viewed as a development which is favourable from every point of view, which 
transcends the academic debate on the possible trade-offs between the individual 
objectives of development, and which also transcends the even more theoretical 
discussion on the most suitable type of political regime for the promotion of 
development. Consequently, another challenge which will have to be faced in the 
years to come is that of converting the process of democratization into a functional 
element of reactivation and development and seeking in these latter factors the 
support needed to consolidate and intensify the building of democracy. 
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III. BASES AND STRATEGY OPTIONS FOR REORIENTING DEVELOPMENT 
I. Development objectives in the new conditions 
Economic growth, rather than a final goal for human effort, is a means of increasing 
well-being and facilitating the achievement of objectives of personal and social 
development. It not only implies that the supply of goods and services should be 
increased, but also that the whole population should have effective access to 
these goods and that their right to obtain them should be institutionalized. 
The development objectives commonly accepted are: a) the transformation of 
the economic structure and the achievement of dynamic growth; b) an advance towards 
more equitable societies; c) the enlargement of the degree of autonomy conducive to 
a more symmetrical system of external economic relations; and d) the increase and 
channelling of the economic and social participation of all the sectors of the 
population and the consolidation of democracy. 
These objectives are often fostered by reciprocal support, since progress 
towards the achievement of some of them facilitates the prosecution of others. In 
specific national situations, however, it may be necessary to select, and in such 
cases it is essential to reconcile goals and graduate the intensity of the pursuit 
of each. Thus, for example, the improvement of the conditions of the lowest-income 
strata and the overcoming of problems of social heterogeneity in which demographic 
dynamics plays an important part have to be reconciled with the capital formation 
needed to ensure dynamic growth and a sustained rise in future standards of welfare; 
the immediate redistribution of assets or income may, in certain circumstances, 
conspire against current accumulation or, in others, be a requisite for the 
mobilization of resources and energies which would amplify this process ana increase 
the efficacy of investment. Again, the content of investment and production must 
be such as to ensure the full use of resources in the long term and the satisfaction 
of the basic needs of the population. At the same time, autonomy and a greater 
symmetry in external relations is facilitated if certain transformations are made 
in the style of living, the patterns of demand and the productive structure, and 
if creative elements are explicitly incorporated into the national cultures and 
into the handling of economic and social development decisions; but these processes 
should incorporate the exigencies of modernization and the emerging demands of an 
increasing popular participation. The prosecution and consolidation of economic 
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and social development, in view of its different aspects, must necessarily comply 
with a series of requisites if the process is to be stable and sustained. 
The experience of countries which have carried out modernization processes in 
order to narrow the gap that separates them from nations which outstripped them 
ovir time suggests the adoption of social mechanisms which permit the incorporation 
of values, behaviour patterns and knowledge deriving from more advanced countries. 
An essential factor in the success of these processes is the incorporation of 
elements of national creation in carrying them out, bearing in mind the problems, 
characteristics, resources, traditions and culture values of the societies 
undergoing modernization. Neither institutions nor life styles can be transplanted 
without adaptation, that is, without a local capacity to remodel its own development 
and technology. 
Moreover, the achievement of a sound process of self-sustained development 
implies an increasingly inward-directed integration and articulation, both economic 
and social, in each country. Historically, in the currently developed countries, 
the dynamics of development was based on the creation of reciprocal demands, 
intersectoral and intra-sectoral, and has generated a greater balance in productivity 
levels throughout the whole productive machinery. 
The stability of societies is not wholly dependent on economic development; 
there must also be progress in the correlative transformation of the social 
structures and in the procedures of political participation. If the pattern of 
growth excludes major sectors of the population, modernization becomes superficial 
and uncertain, and would fail to incorporate a decisive part of the energies of 
the population in favour of development. 
At the same time, the harmonization of development objectives and the formation 
of criteria of social priorities require institutionalized mechanisms for ranking 
the demands of the different social groups. The Latin American societies cannot 
solve all the problems of underdevelopment overnight, or establish the consumer 
patterns of more advantaged nations. Hence, it is vital to find ways of ranking 
demands, adapting their content and meeting them adequately so that they do not 
become a source of conflict which would disrupt the very process of development 
itself. 
The harmonization of the objectives indicated entails the elimination of 
enormous conceptual and practical difficulties in fixing priorities. The way in 
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which the various objectives are combined will certainly vary from country to 
country, but a careful reading of the diagnosis of the previous chapter suggests 
as a common feature of- all the Latin American and Caribbean countries the need to 
widen the very narrow national margins for manoeuvre in reorienting development. 
This basic imperative would imply giving special attention to measures which 
increase the degree of self-determination in national economic policies. 
Nevertheless, the achievement of autonomy should not be pursued to the 
detriment of other development objectives. The aim should be to seek the integrated 
fulfilment of the goals of growth, improving income distribution, stimulating 
transformations, fomenting participative development and improving the national 
capacity for self-determination. The strengthening of control over the destiny of 
the countries of the region has obvious repercussions on the method of organizing 
the content and scope of economic policy and for the mechanisms of reactivating the 
economies (growth), meeting the basic needs of the majorities (distribution), and 
consolidating the process of democratization. 
The aim of reducing external vulnerability should by no means be identified 
with autarky. It means rather a dynamic, selective and diversified insertion in 
the international economy —not an indiscriminate "opening-up"— which will make 
the countries less dependent on the export of a limited number of products or on a 
small number of markets. The aim of increasing the margin for manoeuvre at national 
level is functionally linked with the socio-political objectives of improving income 
distribution and advancing towards more pluralist and participative societies. 
Nowadays the States are not only prevented from using public expenditure as a 
mechanism of persuasion vis-a-vis the productive agents, but they face social 
demands increased by the overall loss of income, attributable to the economic 
depresssion. Thus one of the few ways open is to seek new social consensuses which 
imply an improvement of economic autonomy through the concertation of interests 
with different groups, incorporating them into the process of the formulation and 
taking of decisions. In the same order of ideas mechanisms will have to be set up 
which will promote equity both in the sharing of the burden of the economic 
recession and in the distribution of the benefits of the future reactivation. The 
viability and capacity of concerting interests varies with the political regimes, 
the traditions and the institutional structure of each country, but in all cases 
there is a real possibility of achieving advances where the traditional measures 
merely lead to conflict and social fragmentation. 
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In brief, in order to combine the objectives of sustained growth in 
conditions of productive efficiency, full employment of resources, a more equitable 
distribution of the fruits of growth and the maintenance of an acceptable degree 
of autonomy in the international system, criteria of social efficiency must be 
applied in a dynamic context which takes sufficient account of the maturation 
periods of creativity and of resources, as well as of their interdependence. This 
cannot be regarded as the formulation of a technical problem —which would be 
difficult to solve— but as the stylizing of a political quest for social efficiency 
in the adverse conditions of the crisis facing Latin America and in a context of 
profound transformations. 
2. Programme and criteria for reorienting economic development 
Bearing in mind the restrictions associated with the external sector and with the 
availability of resources for investment, together with the aim of improving national 
autonomies, it is of interest to underline certain central aspects which should 
form part of the development strategies, without excluding consideration of other 
topics or prejudging specific solutions in each country. 
a) External resources 
The external crisis confers special importance on the procurement and 
availability of foreign exchange. It is probable, however, that adjustment through 
the indiscriminate contraction of imports will continue to hamper growth. Even so, 
if import restriction is made selective, apart from reducing the external bottleneck 
it might reorient development towards a less imitative pattern of demand and one 
less vulnerable to external influence. The sustained improvement in the trade 
balance should be based, therefore, on the selective promotion of e.iports and the 
efficient substitution of imports, both aimed at achieving an adequate capacity for 
international competition. 
b) Productive transformation 
Throughout this note emphasis will be laid on the necessity of transforming 
the directly productive activities, both in primary and secondar> sectors. Thus 
agricultural development reoriented towards food security in conditions which 
gradually approach international competitiveness offers a wide field for economic 
growth with equity and the reduction of external vulnerability. In this case, it 
is probable that conditions will arise for a considerable expansion of the domestic 
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markets in many countries of the region, both through the diversification of the 
linkages between agriculture and industry and by the substitution of imported foods 
and the development of the potential market through the satisfaction of the basic 
food and nutritional needs of the lower-income groups of the population. 
The overcoming of the bottlenecks of the current industrialization pattern 
implies that Latin American industry must become internationally competitive, whether 
it directs its production to the domestic market or to export, since in both 
directions the capacity for competition will optimize the balance of payments, 
growth and well-being. 
This would highlight the false alternative of opposing import substitution 
to export promotion. Historically, the substitution of imports has been a requisite 
for achieving industrial capacity to export. In the world today the newly developing 
economies can only consolidate the indispensable industrial capacity in so far as they 
proceed to establish —within a framework of specialization— articulated chains 
of activities (primary, industrial, technological and educational) which will 
strengthen the productive creativity of the community. Without this capacity import 
substitution ends by weakening the industrialization process, and competitive 
exportation becomes impracticable in the long term. 
The promotion of industrial exports and the simultaneous protection of 
strategic activities in the creation of dynamic comparative advantages should be 
related in a coherent industrial development strategy. Protection should be 
maintained and graduated in terms of the progressive increase of the capacity 
for competition in each activity. But it should also be an inducement for the 
improvement of the latter. Export promotion should have levels and modes which 
prevent the system of relative prices from discriminating against the competitiveness 
of industrial exports. From another standpoint, promotion should be differentiated, 
seeking to give priority to the activities which have a greater development potential 
and to create long-term incentives and programmes which will really tend to create 
comparative advantages and specializations to the benefit of foreign trade and 
domestic industrialization, 
c) . Accumulation and resource allocation 
To take once again to the path of growth and at the same time reorient the 
style of development with the external restrictions foreseeable requires an increase 
/in the 
- 49 -
in the efficacy of investment and of capital stocks. The contribution of external 
financing that can be expected in the coming years is slight, and in many cases net 
outflows will be produced in respect of interest payments on the debt. Hence 
domestic saving must play a leading part, although the depression itself makes it 
difficult to recover even the 1970 levels. A first endeavour would need to consist 
in reducing the consumption of the public sector and of the medium and high-income 
population strata, with a view not only to strengthening the flow of resources for 
investment but also to eliminating non-essential imports. Ac the same time the 
internal mechanisms for frocuring funds would have to be improved and instruments 
designed to compete with those used in the exterior. 
Another measure of prime importance would be to reduce the waste which 
frequently accompanies investment processes both public and private. Here there 
is no sense in copying specifications suited to more advanced societies or in 
embarking on non-essential undertakings or, for reasons of imitation, accentuating 
unnecessarily the capital intensity of works and projects. Similarly, a more 
intense and systematic exploitation of installed capacity and the promotion of 
technologies more adapted to the local resource endowment should be a constant 
concern in the task of overcoming the present scarcity of resources. 
There is also an evident need to increase tax revenues and to reorient public 
expenditure in order to cope with the burden of external debt contracted or taken 
over by the State, to promote development through strategic investments in 
infrastructure, to finance promotion programmes for the development of strategic 
activities, resources and technological capacities, and to meet the expenditure 
required by a necessary redistribution of well-being which does not occur through 
market mechanisms and which can only be slow and partial through the raising 
of the real wage. 
At the same time it is imperative to strengthen the saving capacity of the 
private sector and, above all, the productivity of its investment. In this 
connection, the countries face the problem of maintaining adequate levels of 
interest rate in real terms, so that it reflects the relative scarcity of capital, 
and of promoting productive investment in activities which are crucial for 
development. In would be difficult to solve this problem without some degree of 
regulation of the domestic financial system and of the mechanisms which link it with 
the international financial market. 
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The limitation of investment funds and the scarcity of foreign exchange are 
of critical importance in resource allocation. This tends to favour: i) investment 
in labour-intensive activities which make use of the different specialities available 
in each country; ii) the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, which 
represent an important source of employment and of mobilization of organizational 
resources; iii) a better use of natural resources and ecosystems and of the 
existing infrastructure, with complementary or marginal investments which improve 
their overall effectiveness, and iv) the allocation of funds to productive 
activities and to support activities relating to the vertebration of interindustrial 
relations, technological promotion or new specialization for foreign trade. 
Large projects, which may be indispensable in certain cases, must be 
considered with a selective criterion since they entail long periods of gestation. 
There is all the more reason to graduate or discourage, according to circumstances, 
investments directed to the non-essential consumption of the higher-income strata. 
If the processes of productive modernization operate in a context of imitation, 
without corrections based on a broad concept of social efficiency, the 
disparities in the primary distribution of income —which result from the structure 
of ownership and the functioning of the productive system— will continue to create 
inequalities. 
d) The quest for equity 
The quest for equity in a process of growth which harbours marked elements of 
social differentiation always involves difficulties, particularly in market 
economies. In the past attempts have been made to achieve it through policies 
aimed at changing the conditions which determine wage distribution or consumption 
distribution, or through transfers of income to correct the forces of the market. 
If in times of boom these policies were, strictly speaking, insufficient, 
it must be admitted that at present they are still more difficult to attain, 
especially when the initial task consists in trying to prevent the costs of the 
crisis from worsening the situation of the low-income groups of the population. 
Even so, within the limitations imposed by the crisis, there are measures which 
might be taken to improve the distributive effect of reactivation, particularly 
those designed to support the modernization both of peasant farming units and of 
small and medium-sized urban enterprises. 
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As regards the labour force, the object would be to train it and reorient 
it in the direction of the special skills required by the productive apparatus, 
including the provision of public services. Investment in education is the key 
to technological development and to sustained increases in productivity. It is 
also one of the means of changing income distribution in the long term, provided 
that the aim is to meet the educational needs of an employment structure adapte.l 
to local potentialities. 
Respecting policy on wages, it would be expedient to put an end to the erosion 
of their purchasing power beyond that imposed by the reduction of the national 
income caused by the economic crisis. 
In general, redistributive measures are made easier and less costly when 
they relate to the sharing of income increases throughout the process of growth 
rather than to the redistribution —always traumatic— of property. This is valid 
in the case of land, although admittedly there is a need to reform the agrarian 
systems in order to achieve the optimum utilization of resources. 
In the case of the distribution of private consumption, for reasons of equity 
and to generate investment surpluses it would be well to discourage ostentatious 
consumption and to move towards patterns of greater austerity. 
Even so, in view of the marked elements of social differentiation contained 
in the pattern of foreseeable growth and given the magnitude of the social 
deficiencies accumulated, the road towards a reasonable equity will call for 
corrective measures by the State which would be adapted from time to time in 
accordance with the evolution of the basic social consensus. 
These measures range from the subsidized or free provision of essential goods 
to selected groups (or their provision by way of the State;, covering the innumerable 
possible systems of technical and financial assistance directed to mobilizing 
communities towards self-help in construction and the provision of community 
services or the co-operative production of essential goods, and including 
unemployment insurance, subsidies and means for retraining and minimum employment 
programmes with communal aims, to the strengthening and expansion of basic and 
collective public services, which will enable them to be effectively extended to 
the whole of the population, substituting goods for public services such as, for 
example, transport, the private provision of which excludes broad groups of the 
population through their high unitary social cost. 
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3. Short-term economic policy and transformation policy 
The external adjustment of the period 1981-1984 was severe and costly and is far from 
having been consolidated. As already observed, the substantial reduction in the 
external imbalance which took place between 1981 and 1984 was mainly due to the 
enormous and abrupt contraction of imports. It was not surprising that it was 
accompanied by a persistent decline in economic activity up to 1983 and by its 
partial and insufficient recovery in 1984. What is more, this process has been 
aggravated by unusual inflation rates. Consequently Latin America is faced today 
with its greatest challenge since the Great Depression of the 1930s. In fact, to 
begin to overcome the structural deficiencies of the prevailing style of development 
and the negative impact of the crisis on the levels of employment, consumption and 
investment it will be indispensable not only to reactivate the economy and 
re-initiate the process of growth, but also to modify the pattern of development. 
Nevertheless, these objectives must be achieved while maintaining the precarious 
external balance attained in 1984 and reducing inflation. 
This three-fold task eliminates to some extent the traditional distinction 
between the economic policy of the short and the medium term; in fact, if a real 
solution to the immediate problems is to be reached, the application of radical 
structural reforms cannot be postponed. It must be borne in mind that for the 
reasons indicated in other parts of this paper, the rates of future economic growth 
will probably be lower than those observed in the early decades of the postwar 
period. Hence there should be no indulging in false hopes. Henceforward, the 
problems will have to be solved with the limited means at hand and with an 
acceptance of the costs and maturation periods required by the structural 
modernization of the economy and society, 
a) External adjustment with growth 
All in all, hoi^ ever arduous and complex the task, it is still feasible. 
Precisely because the adjustment to the external imbalance was recessive and 
priviliged the financial sphere at the cost of the real, there is at present ample 
productive capacity for initiating reactivation. In other words, it is today not 
only necessary but also possible to replace the recessive adjustment, based on the 
contraction of imports, by an expansive adjustment founded on the increase of exports 
and the efficient substitution of imports. 
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Naturally, the viability and cost of this process will depend in no small 
measure on the external situation and especially on the extent to which this enables 
Latin America to increase its exports and procure financial resources. But the 
possibility of an expansive adjustment will likewise depend on the degree in which, 
through renegotiation processes different from those conducted hitherto, the 
countries of the region succeed in sharing the costs of adjustment more equitably 
between themselves and the banks, and on the degree in which the structure of their 
production changes in favour of internationally tradeable goods (exports and import 
substitutes), and the composition of domestic expenditure changes in favour of 
non-tradeable goods. 
b) The exchange rate, tariffs and export promotion policies 
A basic element of economic policy is the maintenance of realistic and 
slightly undervalued exchange rates. This would mean raising the price of tradeable 
goods (both exports and import substitutes) in relation to non-tradeable goods, 
stimulating their production and discouraging domestic expenditure on these goods. 
Thus, in contrast to tariffs or export incentives, which stimulate the production 
of one group of tradeable goods as against another, devaluation favours all equally. 
Most of the countries of the region have already carried out exchange-rate 
adjustments. Their effects depend on the stability and maintenance of the policy, 
since structural changes in production (from non-tradeable to tradeable goods and 
from domestic to external markets) are costly and inevitably slow. 
Consequently, the main modifications introduced into the exchange rate should 
be reserved for reducing external deficits caused by the permanent changes in the 
terms of trade or in the capital account or to correct obvious cases of overvaluation. 
Conversely, it would be preferable for the deficits caused by cyclical changes in 
external conditions to be compensated by temporary corrections of the tariff 
levels and of export incentives, which do not affect the differences in the 
necessary selectivity of the policies of protection and promotion of the various 
activities. 
Again, it would be useful to ensure that the cost of saving foreign exchange 
through the substitution of imports fonanted by tariffs was equal to the cost of 
generating foreign exchange through the promotion of exports induced by the 
incentives. The fact that the adjustment in the period 1982-1984 was based much more 
on the reduction of imports than on the expansion of exports suggests that if the 
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incentives to exports had been applied more decidedly a large part of the productive 
capacity which now remains idle through lack of imported inputs and a restrictive 
policy of demand might be activated and oriented in part towards the export markets. 
Not only could idle capacity be mobilized but also its impact on supply increased by 
the introduction of a second or third shift in the factories with only marginal 
increments in investment. 
c) Price and subsidy policies 
In order to establish recovery and transformation of tradeable production it 
seems advisable to change the relative prices in favour of exportable production 
and likewise the composition of domestic expenditure in order to increase the volume 
of the output available for external sales and to reduce the demand for imports. 
A major contribution can be made in this respect by correcting the price and subsidy 
policies. 
This general type of orientation should be combined with the distributive 
measures indicated in the previous section, especially in the short term. Thus, 
for example, as the consumption of food products in the poor strata of the population 
is proportionally higher than their consumption of energy, it might well be decided 
to eliminate the subsidies to energy rather than those assigned to food. 
At all events, the distributive measures should increasingly abandon global 
subsidies (or support for prices) which benefit all groups, rich or poor, and 
incline towards income transfers more directly oriented to the less favoured groups. 
d) Investment and public expenditure policies 
In the short term it is desirable that the increase in tradeable goods should 
be based on the fullest possible use of existing capital stock. Even so, there are 
limits to the output of non-tradeable goods that can be transferred to tradeable, 
or to the output of tradeable goods previously destined for the domestic markets 
which can be shifted to exports. In the medium term, the increase in exports and 
in the substitution of imports, and consequently in the share of tradeable goods 
in the GDP, entails: I) changes in the structure and orientation of investment; 
ii) increase in domestic savings to an extent compatible with the minimum growth 
of consumption, and iii) a better allocation of investment. 
The diversity of national situations is so broad that it is only possible 
to indicate sorr.e general guidelines. In the first place, it is essential that 
investment, whether in construction, infrastructure or equipment, should concentrate 
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in preference on increasing exports and on import substitution. In the second 
place, investment which has less need of imported components (for example, 
hydroelectric dams as against thermal power stations) and greater density of labour 
should be given priority. In general, and especially in the short term, this 
suggests a change of orientation in the traditional adjustment programmes, since 
these, in order to reduce the fiscal deficits, tend to cut back investment rather 
than current expenditure. Thus investments in public works and housing figure 
among the first to be reduced, despite the fact that construction generally has 
a low import component, is labour-intensive and has a low opportunity cost because 
the real resources it liberates cannot be readily transferred to the production of 
tradeable goods. 
Of course, not every type of construction is socially or economically desirable. 
For investment in construction not only to serve employment but also to contribute 
to structural adjustment and transformation, it is necessary to give decided 
preference to projects which facilitate exports or the substitution of imports 
(for example, irrigation projects, hydroelectric dams, expansion of ports, 
construction of access roads to land rich in agricultural possibilities or natural 
resources) as compared with those which merely improve the quality of life of 
particular urban zones (for example, underground railways, highways, urban 
infrastructure). 
In the third place, it would be preferable to assign priority to investments 
with short gestation periods and to those where external credit can be more easily 
obtained. In fact, as long as capital inflows remain constrained and while 
restrictive monetary policies continue to be applied, the domestic interest rates 
will be inevitably high, which signifies a fall in the social profitability of 
investment projects with long gestation periods. 
In the same way, as long as the scarcity of foreign exchange persists it will 
be necesary to give priority to those projects for which it will be easier to obtain 
external credit, 
e) Stabilization 
In the context of a high and persistent inflation, where almost all the values 
—wages, rents, taxes, interest rates, exchange rates, debts-*.- are indexed formally 
(through contracts) or informally (through market forces) in relation to inflationary 
expectations, the main rigidity to overcome, in order to reduce a recession to the 
minimum, is precisely that of the aforesaid expectations. 
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The issue is one of great complexity which, in many cases, has to be tackled 
with priority if the countries of the region are to reactivate their economies. 
Above all, it must be pointed out that no stabilization policy can be based solely 
on a restrictive monetary and fiscal policy because the variables that are not 
controlled will certainly depart from the norm and produce an unnecessarily severe 
recession. It would be better to impose a policy of decelerated indexation in 
virtue of which the nominal values of all the key variables of the economy (not only 
of some) —wages, exchange rates, interest rates and prices— would be adjusted 
in accordance with the programmed inflation implicit in the monetary and fiscal 
policy adopted. In this way, in contrast with the traditional anti-inflationary 
programmes, here prices would be controlled or what is known as an incomes policy 
would be applied during this initial period of stabilization, to prevent the free 
fluctuation of prices in response to" uncontrolled inflationary expectations. 
Nevertheless, in contrast to the traditional programmes of price control, 
decelerated indexation would tend not to restrict inflation through the fixing of 
artificially low prices, but rather to bring prices more quickly to thei'r rate of 
equilibrium. In further contrast with the traditional price controls, these 
directives would concentrate on price control in sectors where the producers avail 
themselves of larger margins in order to incorporate their inflationary expectations 
in the prices (there would be control of oligopolies, the industrial sectors that 
fix prices, but not so much of agricultural producers, who tend to live in 
competition). 
Finally, from a logical standpoint, inflation is not determined merely by 
inertia, but it is necessary to correct some key relative prices which have a 
disproportionate effect on other variables, such as the fiscal deficit, the balance 
of payments, and the distribution of income. Hence some of these basic prices 
may have to be corrected in order to make the stabilization programme effective 
without upsetting other macro-economic equilibria. But since the adjustment of 
these prices is almost always upwards there is a risk of provoking inflationary 
expectations (when the private agents interpret the correction as an indication 
of coming inflation rates rather than as a once-for-all change in relative prices); 
hence the corrections must be limited in number and magnitude to the indispensable 
minimum. Again, the success of any stabilization programme depends also on the 
recovery of confidence in government policies. This goes beyond technical 
considerations and enters the field of sccio-politics and concertation, which will 
be discussed later on. ,, . . /4o Articulation 
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4. Articulation of the structure of production 
a) General considerations 
We present here some thoughts on a structure of production that will help to 
overcome external constraint (and thereby recover the capacity for sustained growth) 
and to develop creative potential, both individual and in specific activities. To. 
this end we shall concentrate on two aspects of the internal content of the 
industrial sector and four areas of its external relations. The former relate to' 
the motor-vehicle and capital goods sectors; the latter to the linkage of industry 
with agriculture, the energy sector, mining afid services. It is considered that 
through these aspects a summary can be made of the main characteristics of the 
industrial pattern outlined here, together with the insufficiencies, omissions and 
distortion of the previous industrial scheme. This does not imply a disregard 
for the importance of other industrial branches; it is thought, however, that 
these areas may act as focal points for the consideration and definition of the 
concept of efficiency, thus making it possible to characterize it in a synthetic 
and schematic form. 
The food products branch, incorporated in the analysis of the relation between 
industry and agriculture, is regarded here as the main branch of non-durable 
consumption. In its turn, the motor-vehicle industry is raised to the category 
of main branch of durable consumption and an analysis is also given of the 
production of capital goods. The food products branch represents the linkage 
between industry and agriculture; the motor-vehicle branch represents the industrial 
pattern which has inspired Latin American industrialization, while the capital goods 
branch reflects the truncated technological character of the local version of the 
original industrial pattern of the advanced countries. 
Consequently, action on these aspects identified as strategic has, in the 
first place, an important influence on the capacity to overcome the external 
bottleneck;. In the second., place, the aim would be to develop the capacity of 
adapting- products and' processes to local conditions, in addition to converting them 
into a source o.f training, of skilled manpower in the industrial sector as a whole. 
For example, a basic feature of the urban/motor-vehicle industrial pattern 
has been precisely the-rapid and unplanned growth of urban-conglomerates, together 
with the ensuing speculation in real estate. Among the multiple consequences of 
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this phenomenon there are two that directly affect the possibilities of advancing 
towards a new industrialization: first, the high profit obtained from these 
activities, which discourages the channelling of private investment resources into 
productive activities: and, second, the marked deterioration of the quality of life 
of the urban population in general in respect of housing, environmental hygiene 
and transport. To some extent the high profitability of financial intermediation, 
real estate and commerce appears to be the yardstick for defining the protection 
needed to obtain profits in industry which are not markedly inferior. Consequently, 
far from applying the protection needed for infant industries, we are coming very 
close to that protectionism which, instead of concentrating on domestic learning, 
led merely to reconciling inefficiency with high rates of profitability. 
This aspect presents a major obstacle to the advance towards a new 
industrialization and are clearly linked with the need to find formulas which will 
lead to an allocation of resources in accordance with the national strategy options, 
b) Special considerations in the case of small countries 
In the case of the smaller countries, the concepts of industrialization should 
begin with the recognition of the presence of a larger proportion of rural population, 
an incipient industrial infrastructure and a heavier concentration on a smaller 
number of traditional export products. 
The modernization of agriculture should be a major fulcrum both for the 
raising of rural living standards and for the quest for relative food self-
sufficiency and the generation of foreign exchange. Not only should promotion be 
given to the traditional export lines, but also, as far as possible, to dairy 
products, meat, fruit and vegetables and the range of processed products derived 
t from these, together with the vast array of pharmaceutical goods, toiletries and 
chemical inputs of vegetable origin, which should reach increasing levels of 
complexity. This implies the articulation of a range of technolo.gical support 
services for agricultural industrialization with the different branches of 
application of chemistry to agriculture and with the activity of the metalworking 
sector. 
The other sectors associated with the integral industrialization of natural 
resources are forestry, mining and fishing, which, in addition to exploiting natural 
resources, should be able to take advantage of the potential of the international 
markets. In the three cases it would signify advancing both forward (final products 
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with increasing degrees of processing) and backwards, promoting the metalworking 
support sector. The specificity of this new industrialization of natural resources 
might be justified by the conviction, amply corroborated by international experience, 
that what makes the exploitation of natural resources important and permanent is 
precisely the local capacity to make advances in industrial activities connected 
with them. An extreme example of this potential is found in those countries which, 
lacking natural resources, compete in the international markets solely because of 
their creative contribution in the different phases of their processing. 
Agro-industry and construction could be articulated in a growing and selective 
degree with the metalworking sector, This last industry, in addition to the 
components already mentioned (implements, equipment and installations for agro-
industry, repairs, manufacture of small vessels, metal structures and products for 
construction) might include the assembly of certain transport equipment and the 
production and repair of parts and components. Taken together, the production of 
these simple capital goods represents the output of the metalworking sector and 
would be complemented by the production of durable consumer goods destined for 
mass consumption. The magnitude and importance of the metalworking sector could 
be rapidly increased in terms of its contribution to the training of manpower and 
the selective substitution of imports. 
The main function of agro-industry (including the traditional crops of the 
region) would be to generate surpluses and purchasing power abroad, at least during 
an initial period, as well as guaranteeing self-sufficiency in food. The 
construction and metalworking industries would internalize the effects of the 
investment and of the increased level of domestic activity. Both —together with 
the incipient electronics sector, if it exists— would be the basis for raising 
productivity in the medium term. 
c) Linkage between the industrial and services sectors 
There has been a diffusion of the notion, proper to the developed economies, 
of a historical transition —not without upheavels— from an era governed by the 
industrial sector to a future in which this role would correspond to the services, 
thus completing the sequence agriculture-industry-services. On the basis of this 
simplistic idea policy recommendations have been formulated in Latin American 
countries which, in the event, have favoured the dismantling of industrial plant 
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to accelerate the arrival of the new era. Various comments can be made in this 
connection which, taken together, change the lineal image of a chronological sequence 
from agriculture through industry to services. From the arguments advanced it will 
be clear that, far from being faced with a rigid relationship between increase in 
income and demand for services, we are witnessing an economic and social 
transformation which simultaneously modifies the industrial sector and a wide ra°;e 
of services associated with it. 
To the extent that the industrialization of low-productivity services 
continues to receive the increasing support from the information system, the 
contribution of these activities to the growth of employment will tend to decline. 
The services with high and growing productivity (communications, financial services 
or wholesale trade) are characterized by their high degree of industrialization 
and a notably lower level of employment, which also grows at a slower rate than 
that of the low-productivity services. If one had to identify the sector with 
greatest drive, one would find it at the intersection of those industrial sectors 
that produce the equipment for information technologies (microelectronics, 
computation, telecommunication) and the service activities which transmit, process 
and disseminate information. On the basis of these sectors, the current technical 
change spreads, at different rates and in different forms, to the whole set of 
activities producing goods and services. It is a question of the leadership of 
what might be called the "information system", which includes an increasingly 
symbiotic combination of equipment production and of activities linked with their 
programming. 
This makes it necessary to incorporate into the medium- and long-term 
analysis of the new industrialization the changes that are taking place in the 
industrial sector, the growing complementarity between this and the services, 
the trend towards the industrialization of activities previously classified as 
tertiary, the emergence of the leadership of the information system, articulated 
around the axis of communications, and the resulting importance of the capacity 
for competition of the manufacturing sector in determining Latin America's insertion 
in the international economy. 
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d) The environment and natural resources 
In Latin America and the Caribbean in general insufficient attention has been 
given to the problems relating to the management and use of natural resources and 
to the appropriate administration of the problems of the environment. This had 
led to the emergence and aggravation of phenomena such as deforestation; erosion, 
salinization and loss of soils; sedimentation and pollution of inland and coastal 
waters; desertification; loss of species of flora and fauna, especially tropical 
and marine; contamination and lack of basic services in the cities. All this has 
adverse effects on living standards and the productivity of resources and 
investments. 
The pattern of development in force during the postwar period frequently leads 
to an abusive use of natural resources and, at the same time, the neglect of 
potential resources. This implies in certain cases the depletion and deterioration 
of natural resources; the need to make imports which might be reduced or avoided; 
and the loss of export possibilities. 
Energy is a case in point. When the prices of energy products were low their 
excessive use was encouraged, which not only posed a problem for the energy sector 
but also for external equilibrium and dependence and the general pattern of life, 
which fosters consumption and technology highly intensive in capital goods and 
imported forms of energy. With the rise in energy prices some modifications in 
its use have been introduced but, notwithstanding the growing use of fuel alcohol, 
there has not been sufficient correction of the patterns of energy demand 
incorporated in the structure of supply. 
One of the chief means of integrating natural resources into economic 
exploitation has been the execution of great infrastructure projects. These 
will continue, although probably to a lesser extent than in the past. In a period 
of scarcity of means of investment and of balance-of-payments problems it is 
important to give careful attention to the utilization of investments and to the 
efficient administration of the projects implemented and of the resources already 
incorporated. A region as extensive and as varied in its geography as Latin America 
has a great wealth and diversity of ecosystems. It is necessary to take account 
of their peculiar characteristics and apply a pattern of development and 
administration of the resources and ecosystems which will be adapted to the special 
/features of 
- 62 -
features of each case. This implies the incorporation of creative elements, since 
the attributes of the Latin American ecosystems are often different from those of 
the industrialized and developed countries where the known technologies are created. 
It would be a case of improving the utilization and management of the 
ecosystems not only to exploit the traditional resources of water, land, climate and 
others, but also to take into account the interaction between all their elements 
—flora, fauna, human presence, and the rest— and their capacity to reproduce and 
maintain themselves. This calls for an innovative policy of scientific, technological 
and environmental research which will consider the ecosystem as a complete and 
integrated unit, 
e) Agriculture 
There are two great and pre-eminent goals in agricultural development. The 
first is the eradication of rural poverty, which forms part of the general problem 
of poverty and is associated with problems of unemployment and also with regional 
development. The second is the significant reduction of external vulnerability in 
lines of demand for agricultural products, as in the case of foods. 
It may be said that both objectives form part of another and greater goal; 
namely, food security. This calls for the establishment of national food systems 
which would incorporate the following main requirements: 
i) to be sufficient, in the sense of generating domestic supply, in 
conditions of efficiency, which in volume and composition will satisfy basic 
needs (which does not mean that there must be an autarky in each country) ; 
ii) to be stable, in the sense of possessing mechanisms which will neutralize 
pronounced cyclical fluctuations; 
iii) to be autonomous, in the sense of reducing to a minimum external 
vulnerability in the attainment of sufficiency and stability in the domestic supply; 
iv) to be sustainable in the long term, in the sense that the said objectives 
must not be achieved at the expense of an overexploitation of natural resources 
and the deterioration of the environment, and 
v) to be equitable, which means that they must be capable of meeting the 




With regard to future agricultural development, it would be necessary in 
the first place to intensify the reduction of productive heterogeneity through 
the reinforcement of the peasant economy. To do this the peasantry must be given 
preferential access to productive resources (land, water, inputs and implements) 
in magnitudes and conditions which will meet the needs of the production and 
marketing p rocesses of the peasant economy itself. 
Secondly, there should be a process of selective reorientation of the 
transfer of surpluses. This implies not only the retention of the surpluses 
generated in agriculture, but also the transfer of surpluses from non-agricultural 
sectors and from the modern agricultural sector to that of peasant agriculture. 
Thirdly, it would be necessary to stimulate the industrialization of 
agriculture and a revaluation of rural space, by setting up in agricultural areas 
and in rural zones a series of complementary activities linked with the processing 
of agricultural products and with the production of agricultural inputs, thus 
helping to solve the problem of unemployment. 
Fourthly, there should be an attempt at a progressive reduction of the 
asymmetry in Latin America's international insertion so that agricultural products 
could be exported for which international demand is more elastic in the world 
markets and which are capable of incorporating a greater value-added. 
Fifthly, it is also justified to diminish technological dependence by means 
of a greater adaptation of technologies in order to make them consistent with the 
local resource endowments and with the needs of national development itself. 
In this connection the role of the State is highly important. Instead of importing 
integral technological packages and of using technologies which require the 
acquisition of imported inputs and means of production which may not correspond to 
local conditions, there would be an attempt to make a more selective incorporation. 
At the same time, it would have to be adapted to the local medium, placing the 
accent on those aspects which respond better to the special needs of each country. 
For example, if there is a plentiful supply of labour, scarcity of capital and a 
certain tendency to shortage of land, preference should be given to technologies 
which increase the yield per hectare and at the same time make less intensive use 
of capital. This applies to those technologies which have to do with genetic 
/procedures and 
- 64 -
procedures and improved seeds, with the application of pesticides and fertilizers 
which help to increase the yield per hectare and with farming processes which 
improve the same yield. 
Sixthly, there should be a promotion of recuperation of natural resources 
and a curbing of their deterioration. Peasant agriculture is concentrated in -
marginal regions of low productivity. This leads to the deterioration of the 
natural resources, a process which must be halted an reversed. The rapid natural 
growth of the rural population is a factor contributing, through the subdivision 
of the farms, to an increase in the demographic pressure on the land. 
In all these outlined projects the extension of action to the whole of 
Latin America would enable the requisites put forward for achieving a complete 
food system to be more easily and efficiently fulfilled. Latin American 
co-operation in all the phases of the food chain is possible and desirable. 
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5. Industrialization and technological development 
a) Challenges and structural change 
In the coming years the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean will have 
to faces among other problems, two challenges in which industrialization is directly 
involved. The first is to correct the disequilibria in the domestic structure of 
production, along with the social needs built up and postponed during the previous 
period of rapid growth; this task •—which is one of medium term— has to be recon-
ciled with the urgent need to defend the productive capacity threatened by the 
recession of recent years. The second is the need to adjust in face of the current 
industrial and technological restructuring in the advanced countries, which might 
notably reduce in some sectors the capacity for international competition in the 
production of the various Latin American and Caribbean countries. 
b) The technological and industrial restructuring of the advanced countries; 
implications for Latin America and the Caribbean 
It is vital for Latin America and the Caribbean to realize the speed and effi-
cacy with which the industrialized countries have adapted themselves to the new 
conditions of che energy supply, which is an important but partial manifestation of 
a more complex and radical process of technological and industrial restructuring 
currently in process. The political will to adapt to a challenge of this magnitude, 
together with the flexibility to modify social behaviour and make technological 
innovations, reveals the superiority of situations where endogenous creative capacity 
prevails over uncritical imitations. 
Independently of institutional mechanisms and the differences of emphasis 
placed on State intervention, it is empirically observed that the public sector of 
the industrialized countries is making a systematic and wide-ranging effort to 
stimulate, in close articulation with the private sector, the development and incor-
poration of the most advanced technologies in national productive activity. It is 
agreed that the comparative advantages in international trade in the decades to come 
will be achieved precisely through measures undertaken at national level aud, in the 
case of Europe, complemented by regional action in specific areas. 
These current processes can have numerous implications for the Latin American 
countries; the following will suffice as examples. 
i) As stated above, the advanced countries are preparing and supporting a 
process of transition towards a new technological and industrial pattern with a view 
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to creating a new cycle of growth. This implies that Latin America and the Caribbean 
will presumably be faced with an international situation which, in the short and 
medium term, offers little potential for dynamism, and yet the Latin American econ-
omies need to <&ake exceptional efforts to achieve technological adaptation, since 
otherwise they could be left behind in the new international organization of labour; 
ii) Son® of the sectors in which the most important projects of certain 
countries of the region are found coincide with those in which technological trans-
formations may occur at international level. This applies to the motor-vehicle 
industry, petrochemistry and capital goods; 
iii) The foregoing shows the decisive importance of regional co-operation 
initiatives which will enable a forecast of technological change to be systematically 
incorporated into international negotiations. Otherwise the industrialized centres 
might simply shift to the developing countries manufacturing technologies and 
equipment already outdated by technological change; 
iv) Some of the sectors in which the countries of the region have made a 
concentrated effort in respect of industrial exports make intensive use of labour. 
Here, as a result of developing automation, profound transformations may take place 
which will have a radical effect on the capacity to compete of the national products. 
This might apply to the textile and clothing sectors and to the varied range of toll-
collecting industries. Again, the systematic effort of the developed countries to 
increase efficiency in the use of energy and, in general, of imported raw materials 
might reduce Latin American exports in lines which imply intensive use of natural 
resources, and 
v) In the areas of spearhead technology it is evident that the Latin American 
and Caribbean countries must make a supreme effort for which subregional co-operation 
is indispensable. 
c) Efficiency, growth and creative capacity: the concept of the endogenous 
technological dynamization nucleus 
One of the predominant features of industrialization in Latin America and the 
Caribbean has been its rapid growth since the Second World War. This growth has been 
accompanied by a relative lack of creation, although this does not mean that there 
have not been certain areas of excellence in most of the countries. The combination 
of growth and scant creation explains the dearth of labour opportunities and the 
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growing external constraint, characteristics of the regional pattern of 
industrialization. 
Creation is a complex process which involves a wide range of agents and 
motivations, including entrepreneurs, workers, researchers, industrial plants, 
technological institutes, basic science institutes, organizations for training 
personnel at different levels, mass communication media and the ministries and 
institutions which define policies and norms. It is in the interaction of these 
agents and motivations that creation takes place. 
When communication, interaction and smooth articulation between agents, 
agencies and levels of decision-making are consolidated as a matter of daily 
routine at the national level, there arises what will henceforth be described as 
the endogenous technological dynamization nucleus. Part of this concept is the 
positive value placed by those exercising leadership on the national significance 
of satisfying domestic needs and of favouring a sound insertion into a world economy 
characterized by increasing transparency and intercommunication; a method of 
functioning characterized by smooth communication and articulation between the 
different agents and economic and social sectors taking part in production, on the 
basis of environmental resources and a widespread social appreciation of creative 
activity and of the entrepreneurial function, irrespective of the forms of ownership. 
The value assigned to creation implies an open attitude towards events in the 
rest of the world, both as regards the process of learning and assimilation of 
knowledge and as regards the identification of those activities in which the country 
can achieve levels of excellence which will enable it to meet external and domestic 
needs. 
After all, the special feature of creativity is that it reinforces the 
historical patrimony, the aptitudes, forms of organization and knowledge associated 
with unique local conditions. This process of modernization facilitates insertion 
in the international markets because it adds value, originality and efficacy to the 
designs, processes, techniques and forms of organization of production. A modern-
ization which ignores the local heritage and favours the mere transplanting of forms 
of production achieves at most an ephemeral duplication at a cost in foreign exchange 
difficult to finance and without intrinsic potential for competition. 
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Finally, creativity implies a constant concern for training the population 
(through formal methods, through specialized institutions and the mass communication 
media) and detailed study of local potential, both in terms of natural resources and 
of the possibility of modernizing traditional forms of organization and techniques. 
In the characterization of the endogenous technological dynamization nucleus 
no emphasis has been placed on the size of the markets or on the volume of the 
endowment of natural resources. This is because historical experience has shown that 
there is no clear correlation between leadership and economic and social articulation 
on the one side and size of market or natural resource endowment on the other. This 
does not deny importance to economies of scale in certain activities, but it seeks 
to underline the decisive importance of the pattern of productive activity as a 
reflection of domestic c reative effort. It is in this sense that reference is made 
to an endogenous nature. 
The need to be competitive, coupled with the limited size of the domestic 
market and the requisite process of learning, must necessarily be reflected in more 
specialized types of production than those existing in the advanced economies. Some 
reasearch and development activities, and even training in certain specialized fields, 
require minimum scales which exceed the possibilities of some countries of the region. 
In these cases, the endogenous nucleus can only be established through regional 
co-operation. The same is true of certain activities in the fields of natural 
resource prospecting, communications infrastructure and international marketing. 
Hence regional co-operation is a factor which goes far beyond the limited concept 
of intra-regional trade. 
Support for small and medium-sized enterprise might be another element in the 
quest for domestic articulation and international competitiveness. The selective 
and integrated development of small and medium-sized enterprise is important not 
only because it may achieve high levels of international competitiveness, out 
because, in certain sectors, it tends to create more employment and a greater value-
added per unit of investment than large enterprise. 
Support for small and medium-sized enterprise should include three elements 
which are mutually complementary: purchasing power, deriving basically from the 




d) The false alternative: import substitution strategies as opposed to 
export-oriented strategies 
To say that in Latin America and the Caribbean import substitution strategies 
have failed and that the phase of export-oriented strategies is beginning is to 
oversimplify this issue and the real economic situation. In the first place, it 
is a basic fact that the so-called export-oriented strategies are markedly industri-
alist in character, a feature which is reflected both in the high rates of growth of 
manufacturing output and In the speed of the changes in the structure of production 
achieved and promoted by the industrial sector. In Japan, Korea and Taiwan, average 
annual industrial growth rates during the 1950s and 1960s were approximately 15%, 
i.e., double that of the most dynamic countries of our region, Brazil and Mexico. 
The intense industrial expansion in the export-oriented countries, associated with 
the domestic learning process, led to a 'virtuous circle' of growth, increase in 
productivity and technical progress, and growing participation in the world market 
for manufactured goods. It must be stressed that the penetration into the interna-
tional markets could not be understood without the industrial dynamism and technical 
progress achieved. 
Secondly, there is sometimes a tendency to oversimplify in using the expres-
sions 'import substitution' and 'orientation towards the domestic market' (which 
gives the impression that the dynamic effect of the expansion of the domestic market 
is determined by the intensification of import substitution). This leads to the 
conclusion that if the possibilities of increasing import substitution appear limited, 
the international market becomes the only option for growth. Nevertheless the 
domestic market can be a dynamizing factor in production even if import substitution 
is not intensified or even if it is reduced. 
The foregoing, apart from establishing the importance of a careful use of the 
expressions 'import substitution' and 'domestic market', and evidencing their 
different contribution to the dynamism of production, suggests a third aspect 
relating to the existence of a chronological link between import substitution and 
orientation towards exports which contradicts the view that they are exclusive 
options. The recent increase in Brazil's industrial exports, for example, would be 




A fourth aspect worthy of consideration is the level of aggregation at which 
the analysis is conducted. In fact, since import substitution is measured, for 
analytical purposes, by means of the variation in the import coefficients, it may 
happen that an import substitution process appears positive at one aggregation level 
and negative at another, which is explained by the variations in the composition of 
domestic demand. But more important than this 'optical illusion' is the significance 
for policy interpretation and design of the analysis of the modifications in the 
structure of production, where as much importance should be given to the sectoral 
as to the global level of analysis of import substitution and export promotion. 
To illustrate the combined effect of the different aspects mentioned, the case 
of Korea may be quoted. Taking the period 1955-1973 as a whole, the increase in 
exports appears to be the engine of growth in local production, accompanied, in the 
second place, by the expansion of domestic demand and then by the contribution of 
import substitution, marginal but positive. When the analysis is broken down into 
three subperiods a closer approximation to reality is obtained with different 
indications for interpretation purposes: in the period 1955-1963 the growth of the 
domestic market, strengthened by the dynamic effect of import substitution, accounted 
for close on 90% of the growth of the industrial output; in the period 1963-1970 the 
domestic market remained in the lead, now followed by the increase in exports, and 
the import substitution process was found to be negative; it was only in the final 
period (1970-1973), the culmination of the preceding process, when the rise in exports 
became the engine of growth, followed by the domestic market and by an import 
substitution negative for the economy as a whole. If the sectoral dimension is 
added to this chronological breakdown a new approximation to reality is obtained. 
Thus, even though in the period 1966-1970 import substitution appears as negative 
in the economy as a whole, in 14 of the 25 productive branches the substitution of 
imports has been intensified. Even more significant is the fact that the main effort 
of import substitution was concentrated in branches which are strategic from the 
standpoint of the transformation of production in Korea: petrochemistry, iron and 
steel and transport equipment. In the two last, the contribution of import substi-
tution to the growth of industrial production was higher than that of exports in the 
respective branches. In the following period (1970-1975) import substitution declined 
in the petrochemical and iron and steel industries, and increased in the branches of 
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non-metallic minerals and metal products, while a great effort was initiated in the 
substitution of imports of capital goods. 
If the findings which emerge from the aggregated analysis are contrasted with 
those of the chronological and sectorally disaggregated analysis, it will be seen to 
what extent methodological simplifications can create distortions in the resulting 
recommendations. The situation is aggravated when the subject to be investigated 
serves as the basis of argument for designing a model supposedly for universal 
application. In countries in which the endowment of particular natural resources 
was generous, the achievement of excellence, even in the case of small domestic 
markets, signified an intellectual contribution which improved both the manufacturing 
techniques and the equipment employed, and was accompanied by the development of 
multiple uses and new designs associated with the processing of these natural 
resources. This is the case with the Scandinavian countries which have a large share 
of international trade in manufactures associated with their natural resource 
endowment. 
At a given stage in the industrial development of a country, the accent will 
have to be placed on a number of branches directed to the domestic market, if 
nascent productions are involved and the countries have relatively large national 
markets. In activities which are already at more advanced stages of development, 
the emphasis can be transferred to exports destined for regional or international 
markets. There will also be cases in which sectoral development will have to be 
conducted from the outset in a combination of domestic and international markets, 
as in the manufacture of some metallurgical or chemical goods based on natural 
resources. Small countries will probably have to place more reliance from the outset 
on international markets and particularly subregional markets, to avoid inefficiency 
in production. 
In conclusion, the protection and promotion of the exports of a given sector 
need to be interrelated as regards the levels and forms of application. Protection 
is necessary at the inception of the development of each activity, to be subse-
quently reduced as competitive capacity increases. In their turn, the incentives to 
foreign trade should be at a level which does not discriminate against exports. The 
degree of protection and promotion must also be influenced by the international 
situation. Today most of the countries of the world apply considerable tariff and 
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especially non-tariff restrictions which in many cases are increasing. Hence the 
policy of a .country could not be determined on the assumption of a world of perfect 
competition and free movement of goods and information. 
A common trait in the achievement of international competitiveness by societies 
that are very different in many respects is the fact that, by different routes and 
with different institutional systems, they have advanced in the gradual attainment 
of consensuses; they have consolidated and legitimized domestic leadership; they 
have established minimum norms of equity and solidarity and have achieved a clear 
articulation between State and society; in this context they have created and 
strengthened what was defined above as an endogenous technological dynamization 
nucleus which ensures the continuity of the process of assimilation, learning, 
adaptation and innovation in terms of the satisfaction of needs and the utilization 
of potential, combining selectively, sectorally and chronologically the substitution 
of imports and the generation of sound export flows based on a genuinely internalized 
technological patrimony. 
From this it can be deduced that the assignment of strategic priority to export 
development and to the rationalization of the inherited structure of production — a 
requisite for the achievement of the aforesaid objective (on which there is 
agreement)— should be carried to its extreme consequences. It must be understood 
that the task undertaken is one of national dimensions, transcending by far the 
sphere of trade policy and even that of the economy. It is a question of adopting 
a new style of development which will favour both inward-directed articulation and 
the increase of capacity to compete abroad. International experience suggests that 
it is not a question of antagonistic options, but of requisites which strengthen and 
reinforce each other. 
e) Elements of technological policy design 
The experience of the advanced countries and more recently of the countries of 
Southeast Asia shows that the dynamism and soundness of the industrialization 
process is indissolubly linked with the development of scientific and technological 
capacity. The instability of Latin American industrialization reflects and at the 
same tine is explained in part by the technological backwardness which, with varied 
intensity, is present in all the countries of the region. 
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The diffusion of a sense of vocation and of interest in technological 
activities is a more complex task than the physical expansion of production. In the 
postwar period Latin America's headlong industrialization and technological back-
wardness fully corroborate this statement. 
At this point it is of interest to consider the subject on various overlapping 
planes. The first relates to the group of spearhead technologies around which the 
future technological and industrial pattern will be articulated at international 
level. The second embraces areas in which some Latin American countries have 
succeeded in setting up groups with an adequate critical mass, integrated with 
productive activity and with a certain capacity for international competition. 
Finally, there are several sectors in which there is a manifest lag both in 
scientific and technological infrastructure and in its incorporation into production. 
The spearhead technologies are the basis of the future comparative advantages 
in the international market; on this account alone, the Latin American countries 
should not fail to study them, since the new scientific and technological base will 
not only have projections in international trade but, what is more important, in the 
forms of organization of society and the satisfaction of its basic needs. 
Various considerations suggest, as a strategic option complementary to the 
capacity to compete in international markets, the articulation of the spearhead 
technologies and the basic social services through which the development of the 
scientific, technological, technical and manufacturing base might be produced around 
a dynamic nucleus of national, private, mixed and public enterprises. It would be 
largely a question of articulating a vigorous development of genetic engineering with 
the national health and nutritional needs, and of intensifying the use of the mass 
communication media in education, from the standpoint both of methodology and 
content. For this reason it is extremely important to link education with the 
communication media and with science and technology. 
The consolidation of technologies in Latin America is conditioned by the 
capacity to absorb the impact of the technologies being developed in the world 
centres. The consolidated technologies include some agronomic specialities and 
certain disciplines linked with the energy sector and with civil engineering. Here 
there exists a critical mass of knowledge and personnel teams, an acceptable degree 
of integration with production and localized expressions of a capacity for interna-
tional competition. In these areas it would be appropriate, in the first place, to 
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strengthen the existing nuclei, favouring the use of the present technological base 
by the productive machinery. The linkage between research and production in the 
agricultural sector seems to require a decided effort of articulation in which an 
important role can be played by the regional and national development banks. 
In these three fields —-agronomy, civil engineering and energy— it would also 
be necessary to undertake systematic international promotion activities which would 
take into account both external policy and the economic and trade relations of the 
countries of the region. 
Finally, a part of Latin America's technological backwardness is concentrated 
in the industrial sector. Here it would be expedient to direct attention to certain 
areas where there is a very wide gap between the physical capacity for production and 
the technological support infrastructure. Outstanding among these areas are the food, 
chemical and capital goods industries. 
In relation to the activities and instruments of technological policy, it would 
be advisable to rely on the experience built up in Latin America in the last decade 
with its combination of achievements and frustrations, together with that of other 
countries, especially the advanced countries and those of Southeast Asia. Solely 
by way of illustration, some priority fields are mentioned below: 
1) The strengthening of scientific infrastructure (research and post-graduate 
training) and technology (establishment of norms, metrology, quality control, infor-
mation systems, technological training and research). The scarcity of foreign 
exchange and public funds has limited the resources destined for these activities, 
despite the fact that they tend to promote the articulation of the demands of the 
productive system with the technological infrastructure. This very fact may incite 
the various agents who are encountering technological obstacles to have recourse to 
solutions available in the region at much lower cost. 
2) The substantive and institutional integration of technological policy 
instruments into the sphere of industrial policy, with the promotion of the direct 
presence of the entrepreneurial sector, both public and private. In particular, 
there should be an abandonment of the practice, frequent in Latin America, of 
isolating the institutions and ministries responsible for the sectors producing 
gocis and services from the functions of co-ordination of science and technology, 
3) Reform of the educational systems and the mass communication media with a 
viev to setting a higher social value on domestic technological innovation, at the 
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same time amplifying and disseminating information on world scientific and techno-
logical advances. The quest for functional solutions to local needs and potential 
should become one of the guiding criteria of social communication. In this sphere 
there is abundant room for subregional and regional co-operation which may yield 
valuable by-products for consolidating the usefulness and prestige of Latin American 
integration. 
4) The reduction of the costs of technological activities through credit 
instruments and fiscal incentives which will include both the research and marketing 
phases. 
5) The reduction of the risks inherent in technological activities through 
the creation of risk capital, the selective protection of the domestic market and 
support for the placing of designs, processes and manufacturing techniques developed 
locally in the international markets. 
Finally, measures should be adopted with a view to reducing the emigration of 
scientific and technical personnel. 
6. The financing of development 
The crisis of the international economy and the crisis of Latin American indebtedness 
have completely changed the basic conditions in which the major problem of the 
financing of development was handled during the postwar period. 
In effect, from the end of the 1940s, with the creation of the multinational 
institutions of the United Nations and the Truman doctrine concerning bilateral 
relations, financial aid for development was consecrated as a basic principle of 
international co-operation. In this connection, the Alliance for Progress, the 
creation of regional banks and of systems of (financial) evaluation of national 
plans, introduced at the beginning of the 1960s, did no more than reaffirm a pattern 
already established in international relations. 
The aims of these and other financial mechanisms were not only to foster the 
development of the backward zones, but also to create a necessary climate of 
stability in the monetary system and in the international exchange-rate policies. 
Credit flowed towards the periphery, but it was always limited and subject to strict 
rules, in which the aims of development were subordinated to the exigencies of the 
equilibrium of the financial and monetary markets. 
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All iSiis regulated arrangement began to change with the establishment of the -
floating parities which were to replace the Bretton Woods system, after the United 
States government abandoned the fixed ratio between the dollar and the price of gold. 
As a matter of fact, the weakening of the old financial order took place earlier and 
it would be true to say that one of its first institutional manifestations was 
precisely the emergence of the Eurodollar market. In its origin, this market 
signified a way of escape from national regulations and a decisive step towards the 
integration of the financial markets outside the normal standards imposed by govern-
ments individually or through multilateral agreements. 
To say nothing of the non-fulfilment of the development goals of the first and 
second decade as regards financing, the 1970s were characterized by the industrialized 
governments' abdication in favour of the international private banks of their respon-
sibilities in providing foreign exchange for the developing countries. The new role 
of the commercial bankers provided a ready solution to the complex problem of the 
recycling of the petrodollars, and Latin America welcomed a mechanism which freed 
the authorities from the red tape, supervision and conditionalities of the previous 
credit systems, in a decade in which there was a marked fluctuation in the currents 
of international trade and in which the changes and floating interest rates confused 
the exigencies of external development financing. 
Nonetheless, the flows from the commercial banks soon succumbed to the 
pressures of the international recession caused by the second rise in oil prices 
(1979). The crisis of indebtedness came to a peak in 1982. This was the culmination 
of a cycle in which the Latin American countries had access in the first instance to 
bilateral and multilateral financial aid and, later, to the liberal contributions 
of the transnational banks. It may be that the flows of direct investment are 
increasing, though they will hardly be able to replace in character and volume the 
other sources of net funds. In the 1980s Latin America faces a total, or almost 
total, retraction of the contribution to its development of external saving, as a 
result of a radical change in the conditions of the international economy. It would 
be illusory to expect these circumstances to change in the short and medium term. 
The determining factors are of a structural nature and will take time to produce the 
adjustments needed at world level for a return to a regime similar to that previpusly 
in force. Hence the most probable development —and the Latin American governments 
should be forearmed— is that the balances on the balance-of-payments capital account, 
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instead of providing a relief, will be an additional charge on the efforts at 
capital formation in the region. 
Hence it seems inescapable to restate the whole policy of future financing for 
the Latin American economies. The main bases will have to be found in the mobili-
lization of domestic saving and in the introduction of investment patterns much more 
austere and much more closely related to national priorities. It must be admitted 
that from abroad the most that can be expected will be a modest mobilization of net 
funds from official sources, coupled with the possibility of improving the conditions 
of the renegotiation of the debt and of repeating again and again the rounds of 
negotiations. 
This is not the occasion to describe the reorientation of financial strategies. 
Suffice it to go more deeply into some proposals of a general nature. In the first 
place, the mechanisms for obtaining domestic savings must be modernized. This would 
involve not only the creation of incentives for the formation of surpluses —among 
which the fixing of passive interest rates at positive levels is a first requisite— 
but also the completion of the domestic financial circuits, that is, the improvement 
of the institutions and instruments of financial intermediation. The mobilization 
of savings implies, on the one hand, an increase in the proportion of those which are 
collected and redistributed by the modern financial sector and, on the other, a 
strengthening of the habits of insurance and saving. From this standpoint, it would 
be useful to improve the banking and extra-banking mechanisms which assist the saver 
and the treasuries of enterprises in the handling of their liquid funds. Again, the 
actual instruments of collection would have to be modernized with a view to guaran-
teeing the purchasing power of the savings and of making them competitive with those 
offered in the international financial markets. This would be a step towards the 
reconstruction of the financial circuits which formerly were completed with the 
intervention of the foreign banks. It would also help to retain in the countries of 
the region the resources which escape owing to the enormous facilities for flight 
created by the integration of the money and capital markets, and perhaps also to 
repatriate part of that previously sent abroad. As regards the task of transforming 
the national systems of financial intermediation, just as support was given in the 
past to industrial development, now priority would have to be assigned to the changing 
of those systems. Naturally this would not only have a national dimension, but might 
also have effects at the regional and subregional level. It is not difficult to 
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conceive the formation of integrated credit networks favouring interzonal trade or 
promoting investment based on the Latin American manufacture of capital goods. The 
linkage of the stock markets, the organization of credits in consortium, the 
emission of regional savings bonds, or the creation of zonal systems of insurance 
and guarantees are other possibilities that should be systematically explored. 
Even so, it is highly probable that the financial bottlenecks will be one of 
the most serious obstacles to development in the immediate future. This gives rise 
to the other requisite which should be met in the designing of a realistic financing 
strategy: a rigorousness in allocation and austerity in the use of investment funds. 
In this field there are several criteria that should not be ignored. One calls for 
reduction of the waste that frequently accompanies both public and private invest-
ment projects. The building of cities of monstrous size and the opulent instal-
lations of social security, the construction of administrative offices and 
residential areas which sometimes exceed in luxury those of the industrialized 
countries, are obvious examples of the magnitude of the waste. Similarly an effort 
would have to be made, with a discipline perhaps unknown before, to establish a 
stricter order of priorities in the distribution of funds for the new investment, 
mainly that of a public nature. Here there is no longer room for manoeuvre. The 
crisis compels the choice of that which will most readily reactivate the economies 
and restrain inflation. The projects would have to be well assessed, and integrated 
in groups which would facilitate labour absorption and the rapid growth of supply. 
The care and protection of infrastructure and capital goods already installed would 
also have to be a primary concern, along with the greatest possible use of the 
installations available. The specifications in construction and in the building 
of works of infrastructure should be based on local standards, those of countries 
short of capital, instead of adopting the norms of rich nations. Technological 
effort in respect of capital goods should be directed to the manufacture of 
equipment in which for the first time the deliberate aim would be its adaptation 
to the domestic factor endowment. In short, Latin America will have to learn to 
do more with less, and to make better use of the surpluses of the economic systems 
which always arise from current social sacrifice. 
/7. Intra-regional 
- 79 -
7o Intra-regional co-operation 
Intra-regional co-operation and the deepening of subregional integration may play 
an important part in enlarging the margins of manoeuvre in the conduct of economic 
policy and in the transformation of Latin America's productive capacity on the bases 
of greater efficiency and competitive power. 
In the present situation, integration and co-operation may help to overcome 
the crisis through instruments which will make greater use of installed capacity and 
human resources, reducing to a minimum the use of the scarce convertible foreign 
currency in the region. The increase of regional trade, without diminishing exports 
to third countries, and import substitution on a regional scale are two of the basic 
mechanisms for restoring the economic activity levels lost in the crisis. 
In the medium and long term, integration and co-operation may help to generate 
conditions for a more autonomous, stable and rapid development through the creation 
of an economic space more extensive than the national space of each country. Thus, 
for example, joint initiatives may be undertaken to eliminate the sectoral disparities 
caused by an incomplete process of industrialization, and to improve the articulation 
between productive sectors. Again, support may be given to the development of 
branches and activities which have lagged behind, such as that of capital goods. In 
the same way it will be possible to give real substance to co-operation in the field 
of food and energy security if there is s community view of the need to overcome the 
risks produced by dependency in those sectors, and of the urgency of this task. 
Furthermore, through co-operative effort at regional and subregional level 
Latin America and the Caribbean will be in a better position to cope with the adverse 
factors deriving from the international economy and to take advantage of the oppor-
tunities that this will continue to offer. Thus, for example, there are obvious 
advantages in continuing the interchange of information and in increasing consulta-
tion regarding the restructuring of each country's external debt, or the concerta-
tion of negotiating positions vis-a-vis the industrialized countries in respect of 
adjustments to the standards regulating trade and the international financing and 
monetary flows. Intra-regional co-operation can also facilitate the development of 
new export lines to third countries, not only through the efficiency gained by virtue 
of the economies of scale of the enlarged markets created by integration commitments, 
but also as a result of associated multinational efforts in support of the production 
and marketing of tradeable goods. 
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It should be noted that it would not be a question of restoring conceptual 
schemes from the past which favoured a gradual and progressive integration of several 
economies ending in the formation, within predetermined periods, of a single regional 
economy. The idea is to promote joint action to solve common problems, which offers 
a wide and fertile field for putting intra-regional co-operation at the service of 
reactivation and development. The task would be simplified if an impulse were given, 
first, to the relatively homogeneous groups of countries which have already shown 
a certain will towards integration —the Central American Common Market, the Andean 
Group, the Caribbean Community, and the large countries associated with ALADI— and, 
then, among the groups or units of integration. 
Co-operation should not be limited to the industrial sector. In agriculture, 
mining and natural resources there are likewise co-operation possibilities which 
cover the production, processing and marketing of goods. Similarly, in technology 
and in the more advanced sectors, such as information processing and others, there 
are increasing opportunities for joining forces in the solution of some basic 
problems. Lastly, as has been indicated above, there are also possibilities of 
stimulating co-operation in the financial sphere. 
Among the mechanisms or procedures designed to promote subregional integration 
the following may be mentioned: tariff preferences, which under ALADI have been 
negotiated and fixed at a low level and which can be employed on a wider scale; the 
elimination or limitation of non-tariff restrictions; the channelling of a proportion 
of State purchases towards the region; the improvement and interlinking of systems 
of compensatory payments and reciprocal credits, and in general of the financial 
mechanisms associated with intra-zonal trade; the promotion of partial agreements 
and, when applicable, of compensated trade and the strengthening of the subregional 
and regional institutions which, in one way or another, give support to integration. 
Finally, it should be noted that, if integration is conceived as a process in 
which all the social, political and economic agents play an active part, the existence 




8. State, planning and democracy 
a) ECLAC's conception of the role of the State 
In face of the economic, social and political challenges of the present crisis, 
the demands on the State of the civil society appear to be multiplying. Originally, 
ECLAG saw the State as one of the leading actors in the development process. There 
were many areas of the economy in which it considered State orientation and interven-
tion necessary, particularly in the following; first, in the conception of a global 
and long-term view which would be systematically reflected in the plans destined to 
transform the existing structures for the formation of a modern industrial economy; 
second, in the orientation of action in decisive areas of this transformation plan, 
such as the promotion and support of capital accumulations the protection and devel-
opment of industrialization, the reduction of external vulnerability, the creation 
of infrastructure, or the stimulus and orientation of technological change, and 
third, in close relation to the two preceding areas, the prevention and control of 
the economic imbalances which inevitably accompany structural change. 
The aim of this conception was to find a balance between the public and the 
private sector, between the State and the market, which would take advantage of the 
positive aspects of each, facilitate their complementation and avoid the negative 
consequences of the excessive predominance of one over the other, and the impression 
of conflict between their respective roles. This balance was conceived as the 
expression of an institutional framework which would combine the fundamental 
principles of a market economy with the indispensable action of the State. In this 
particular combination, the State's action tended rather to complement and sustain 
the market than to transform it radically. 
In brief, ECLAG advocated a planning State which, guided by a development plan 
and using monetary, fiscal, exchange and tariff instruments, would urge all the 
economic agents to satisfy determined aims. The final result of the creative 
interaction between the activity of private agents and the action of the State should 
be the strengthening of the economy as a whole. 
b) Considerations on State action 
Recent decades have provided rich and varied experience on the virtues and 
defects of the economic action of the State and of the market, and have led to the 
widespread view that neither one nor the other, by themselves alone, can ensure an 
/efficient and 
- 82 -
efficient and equitable economic development. The unilateral programmes, which 
derive from the predominance of one or the other, do not appear to find viable 
solutions. Hence the problem remains of finding new and agreed equilibria between 
the public and the private sector. 
During most of the 1960s and 1970s it was assumed that in Latin America the 
State was in a position to fulfil the role assigned to it by the development 
strategy. However, the opposite was frequently the case. In fact, the position of 
the State from an institutional, administrative and socio-political standpoint was 
not always in line with its assumed capacity to guide the process of development. 
These assumptions were submitted to severe criticisms, both from a theoretical 
and practical point of view. For example, it was pointed out that the State apparatus 
had not the internal unity and coherence that had been assumed and that it was rather 
a complex structure in which, in the midst of a task of increasing magnitude, 
multiple agents tried to promote their particular interests. Moreover, the orienta-
tion of State action was often not the result of the autonomous and imperative 
application of a certain technical rationale but the consequence of complicated 
processes of decision-taking affected by the interaction of power groups with dif-
ferent lines of reasoning. Again, the technical and administrative efficiency of 
the State could not be merely assumed, but had to be regarded as a problem of 
difficult solution. Lastly, State control of economic relations with the exterior 
became increasingly limited in the context of an international economy which was 
becoming rapidly transnationalized. In these circumstances, the State was frequently 
unable to undertake all the tasks which had been assigned to it or to fulfil them 
efficiently. Intense criticisms arose, some sufficiently sound to make a profound 
impact on the conventional form of criticism applied to political questions in 
general and to the State in particular. When these issues are reformulated from 
the standpoint of current needs, the decisive question seems to be how to formulate 
and carry out strategies aimed at development, autonomy, equity and democracy 
without the support of Ideal States, the existence of which was previously taken for 
granted. 
Paradoxically, at the same time as a more realistic view was being adopted of 
its capacity, the State was expanding and diversifying its structure to assume ever 
wider functions which were imposed on it by the economic, social and political 
circumstances, along with the weaknesses and deficiencies of the other economic 
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Some of the chief causes of the expansion of the Latin American State in the 
economic and industrializing process originate in the underdeveloped and peripheral 
character of the societies of the region» The local private agents are weak in 
comparison with the power of their counterparts abroad. The relative weakness of 
some and the strength of others, in the framework of growing economic, financial 
and technological demands, impose ever increasing functions on the State. In some of 
these cases, the State has tried to attract or control foreign agents while favouring 
the development of the national private sector. In fact, it has frequently fostered 
the activity of the latter by offering it opportunities for investment, credit, 
protection against external competition and certain internal risks, as well as 
ensuring it a stable demand (through the State purchasing power), by granting it 
access to low-priced inputs, guaranteeing it profitability, etc. 
At the same time, State action in the social field originates in part from the 
fact that Latin American economic growth has manifested tendencies towards social and 
regional concentration of power, income and wealth. These trends result in disequi-
libria which, in some cases, have been aggravated by social and political activities 
and aspirations directed towards mobilization and democratization. In other cases, 
the State has had to settle difficult social conflicts arising from the growth and 
expectations of the population itself, as well as from the demands coming from the 
groups that emerge with economic progress. 
Finally, as regards the political process, the State has also had to face 
opposing trends. Besides the functions relating to its internal and external consol-
idation, the State has on the one hand had to guarantee the maintenance of an 
institutional order whose dynamism accentuates the growing concentration of economic 
power, On the other hand, it has had not only to represent a regime of global 
rationality binding together individual interests, but also to create a flexible 
institutional ambience which will incorporate all the social forces activated by 
the development. 
These are, in brief, some of the main reasons why the State has expanded its 
action in the economic, social and political fields. The concrete forms which this 
expansion has assumed have been very diverse, as also have been the priorities 
established in each concrete case. 
The functions of the State have varied over time and in recent years as a 
result of the economic crisis and the processes of democratization. The dilemma 
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consists, not in clarifying whether the State should or should not act, because 
obviously it will do so, but in perceiving what should be the characteristics of 
this action in present-day Latin America and in view of the set of objectives 
directed towards democracy, autonomy, growth and equity. 
The State is faced with new challenges made more pressing by the crisis. This 
reduces the degrees of liberty, limits internal and external resources, and slows 
down the growth rate, which makes it more difficult to settle conflicts and take up 
options which will reduce the differences between the social strata. To meet these 
challenges a vigorous —but not overextended— State is required which can gradually 
increase its technical and administrative efficiency, its political capacity and its 
economic and financial solidity. 
The increase of the technical and administrative efficiency of the State 
apparatus is an objective which could be universally accepted, always provided that 
it is not placed above the other objectives which should guide State action. In 
effect, Latin America has reached the point where it is evident that efficiency 
should be subordinated to the social efficacy of the global action of the State, an 
efficacy deriving from the coherence of State action with the various objectives 
which should guide it. 
The State's political capacity basically relates to its willingness to 
exercise its authority over all the social groups. Nonetheless, a strong or effec-
tive State of this nature cannot be based solely or primarily on the use of the 
coercive power characteristic of an authoritarian political organization, but must 
rely on the principles which give legitimacy to its mandate. Within the political 
culture prevailing, this legitimacy can only be attained through the revalidation 
of democratic political principles. In other words, in principle and apart from 
other requisites, legitimacy will be accorded to the authority which emanates from 
a democratic State. This is the only way to attain the level of responsibility and 
individual and collective discipline which will serve as a firm foundation for a 
State political capacity that is vigorous and stable. 
The economic and financial power of the State is closely allied to its polit-
ical capacity, since the two attributes support each other. This power is expressed 
and exerciseS in various ways, but its central nucleus is built upon two main 
aspects: on the one hand, the capacity for leadership and concertation, which enables 
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the State to unite people's wills behind collective economic aims; and, on the 
other hand, the capacity to control and guide the process of capital accumulation. 
It is difficult to decide on the most suitable procedures for consolidating this 
latter capacity, but the most familiar are the good use of economic policy instru-
ments, direct investment of a productive type and the control of financial mechanisms 
both public and private. Only concrete circumstances can indicate which combination 
of these is the most appropriate. 
c) Planning and crisis 
To increase the capacity of the State in most of the Latin American countries 
there is no need for an enlargement of its functions and attributes but for the 
adequate exercise of those which it already has. Here once again planning plays an 
important role as an instrument of rationalizing State action. It is not necessary 
to repeat the familiar theoretic elements which are the bases of planning, but it is 
indeed of interest to point out certain problems which have not been solved, at least 
in practice, such as the compatibility of aims and policies in the medium and long 
term or the combination of goals of growth and equity. 
Again, the articulation of the management of the principal State entities, 
such as the central administration, the public enterprises and provincial adminis-
trations, is also a matter of special importance. In many Latin American countries, 
above all in those where inflation is intense, public investment comes to have an 
importance which it could scarcely have acquired in earlier conditions. In some 
countries over 50% of investment is public and it continues to be the basic source 
of the infrastructure needed for development, which justifies in itself the need for 
long-term planning. 
d) Democratization 
The main political aim of a development strategy should be the establishment 
and consolidation of democratic forms of social organization. This objective is 
justified for three main reasons: for the intrinsic value of democratic principles; 
for the role that democratic mechanisms of articulation of interests can play in the 
stabilization and institutionalization of the political process, by permitting the 
participation of all the social groups; and for the relation between the existence 
of both the above elements with the objectives of social equity. These aspects, 
summarized in terms of participation, liberty and equity, form a delicate balance, 
which should exist if one is to be able to speak of a genuine democratization. 
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Democratic forms are manifested institutionally in three main mechanisms. The 
first consists of instruments proper to liberal democracy, based on the aggregative 
and representative functioning, freely exercised, of the political parties, through 
parliamentary elections and institutions, and on the civil and political rights on 
which these instruments are founded. Some of the obstacles in the way of the full 
application of these instruments in many Latin American countries, and the regressions 
that have taken place in a number of them, indicate the difficulty of the future task 
and the incompleteness of that hitherto realized, while at the same time the renewed 
strengthening of democratic movements indicates the persistence of these political 
values. 
Secondly, there are important nuclei of economic power whose articulation, 
indispensable for stabilizing and orienting the political and economic processes, is 
not fully achieved by the traditional democratic mechanisms. Outstanding among these 
nuclei are the entrepreneurial associations and the trade unions, which in their wide 
variety pluralize and at the same time complicate the aforesaid processes. This 
situation has given rise to procedures of social concertation among these groups and 
with them, which frequently succeed in becoming institutionalized as economic and 
social councils. Although they have had a precarious existence in Latin America 
they represent a promising path for the establishment of forms of harmonization and 
concertation of interests. They should by no means replace the traditional democratic 
mechanisms, but they can certainly help to achieve a greater coherence between the 
political parties that they represent. 
In the third place, liberal-democratic mechanisms and procedures of concerta-
tion do not exhaust the process of democratization, since the growing concentration 
of State and private economic power entails a search for ways of diffusing and 
controlling this power. It is a question here of deepening the democratization of 
the public and private enterprises, which constitute the current supreme examples 
of concentration of economic power. This deepening can assume various forms, 
implying different degrees and modes of participation, such as the participation of 
employees in the capital, or even in the management, of enterprises; the self-
government and strengthening of co-operatives, etc. In several Latin American 
countries co-operatives are being reinforced. Experiments in participation in 
private and State enterprises should be encouraged and improved, since they seek to 
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overcome the dilemma presented by the present co-existence of two opposing trends: 
economic concentration in large organizations and the urge towards democratization. 
All the democratization mechanisms indicated require as an indispensable 
foundation the existence of a democratic society, that is to say, a society which 
accepts the legitimacy of the institutional mechanisms through which the diverse 
interests are organized, expressed and reciprocally influenced. Mechanisms are 
empty forms if they have no social base to legitimate them, but this social base 
must necessarily reach some degree of agreement conducive to the democratic disci-
pline which is an essential component of a State having sufficient authority to 
carry out decisions reached democratically. Indeed, democratic regimes have to be 
firm in exercising their authority, since the existence of democracy must not be 
confused with the absence of authority. The same firmness that they apply in the 
defence of democratic procedures and the taking of decisions should be used to insist 
on the observance of the latter. The recent history of developing countries has many 
examples of the negative implications for democracy itself of an unwilligness to 
exercise the power possessed by the democratic regimes; they should reconcile 
economic reality with arbitration between the key forces of society, in order to 
achieve a sufficiently wide combination of support to guarantee the survival of the 
regime itself and certain advances in general well-being. Their viability depends 
on the structural changes they introduce into society and the economy, on the 
evolution of the external sector and on the receptivity and flexibility of the forces 
capable of making themselves heard. This last factor is undoubtedly one of the most 
important for the future of these regimes; that is, to achieve the support of the 
different political parties and of the social groups and classes or their represen-
tative organizations, which should try to express themselves through their parties 
in the existing organs of power. This support requires of the different sectors of 
society that they should formulate realistic responses to the options before them 
and help to put these options into practice, displaying a sufficient capacity for 
overcoming undetermined issues and for combining the vigorous defence of their own 
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